A Haroon Akram-Lodhi

Attacking the Pakhtuns

A Haroon Akram-Lodhi, ISS Resident Project Leader, Vietnamese-Dutch Project for MA Programme in Development Economics, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam haroon@hcm.vnn.vn

On 11 September 2001 a barbaric crime against humanity was committed. The genocidal attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were totally indiscriminate, killing people from around the world, from every social class, every set of political beliefs, every faith. The response of the United States to the attacks has led to aerial attacks on sites across Afghanistan, and to the deployment of US and UK special forces on the ground. The objective is to eliminate Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network, and in order to do this it has been deemed necessary to remove the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan. A great deal of diplomatic effort has been undertaken to unite the diverse groups opposed to the Taliban—the Uzbek and Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance, supporters of deposed and exiled monarch Mohammed Zahir Shah, anti-Talibanis based in Peshawar, and opponents of the Taliban operating within Taliban controlled areas. In seeking to establish a ‘broad-based alternative’ to the Taliban, the US and its allies are trying to treat Afghanistan as a state within the international community. A failed state, perhaps, but nonetheless one that has the potential to operate according to a set of rules that they understand. In this, they are wrong, and by being wrong, they may laying the ground for a tragedy of even more immense proportions than that witnessed in New York City and Washington.

The fundamental source of identity for the peoples of Afghanistan is not nationality but ethnicity. Afghanistan is dominated in the east, south and center by Sunni Pakhtuns, who account for just under a half of the country’s population. The members of the Taliban are predominantly Pakhtun, and both their opponents and their supporters in the regions where they hold sway are predominantly Pakhtun. So too are many of their opponents, barring the Northern Alliance, which is dominated by Shia Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras. The struggle for the control of Afghanistan is thus both ethnic and religious in nature, as it has been since the overthrow of the king in 1974.

The Pakhtuns are a tribal people; indeed, they are the largest tribe of their type in the world. The Pakhtuns strive to follow an ‘ideal’ code of behaviour known as Pakhtunwali. In a Pakhtun’s ‘perfect’ world, strictly following this code of behaviour ensures the respectability, reputation and honour of the household and its patriarch. However, the world is not perfect, and Pakhtuns seek to follow as best they can Pakhtunwali in order to be seen by society as striving to ‘be’ Pakhtun. To not conform to this code of conduct is to not be a Pakhtun, and this is the greatest fear of the Pakhtun. For a Pakhtun not to be seen to be a Pakhtun amongst their community brings shame that can only be corrected by blood revenge. This is why violence amongst Pakhtuns is highly structured, and also explains why violence occurs amongst close relatives with greater frequency than in other societies: close relatives know how to shame.

For the Paktun, a key means by which respectability, reputation and honour can be accrued is through the capacity to demonstrate autonomy and hence self-reliance. One who is self-reliant is their own master and for the Pakhtun the most important freedom is not having to recognize another person as a superior. Pakhtuns strive to avoid relations of dependence upon their equals, while striving to make their equals dependent upon them. It was this complex micro-motivation that, when writ large, led to divisions within the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan following the overthrow of the king, to the Soviet intervention of 1979, and the tenacious war against the Soviet Army. Indeed, this is an important reason why there is so much violence within Pakhtun society in general, and households in particular. Men and women always consider their own patriline superior, and thus hostility is a structural component of marriage, a hostility that frequently leads to acts of violence. Casual violence, amongst men, amongst women, amongst children, between men and women, between men and children, and between women and children, is a totally normal way of ensuring that another is not recognized as a superior in Pakhtun society.

The three basic tenets of Pakhtunwali—revenge, hospitality and refuge—are all ways in which a Pakhtun can show a basic mastery of the circumstances that they confront. These tenets are more important than the seven pillars of Islam, which have therefore adapted to suit local needs. For example, jihad as a source of Islamic identity suggests doing what is necessary to better yourself. For the Pakhtun, this comes by demonstrating a basic mastery over the circumstances that are faced. In this way, jihad becomes subsumed within Pakhtunwali, and jihad takes on a meaning that is consistent with Pakhtun social relations, even though interpreting it in a tribally particularistic way is inconsistent with Islamic ideology. Indeed, the ‘Pakhtunization’ of jihad explains, to a degree, the reason why the Taliban are willing to harbour bin Laden and his network. Providing refuge for al-Qaeda makes them ‘better’ Pakhtuns. Once hospitality was granted, to give it up under the pressure of an outside force such as the US would demonstrate that these Pakhtuns do not have mastery over their circumstances. They would not ‘be’ Pakhtun. In this way, the motivations of the Taliban are consistent with the expectations of the society from which they came.

The need to demonstrate autonomy and self-reliance explains why, for the Pakhtun, agriculture and combat are deemed to be the only two occupations that bring honour. They are both occupations that can be performed solitarily. To a Pakhtun, working for another means relying upon them and this suggests that a person is not Pakhtun. Similarly, one who does not have land is not deemed to ‘be’ Pakhtun. Land is the basis by which men can be members of the jirga, and be recognized as being Pakhtun by their community. Indeed, in that it deepens the capacity to demonstrate autonomy and self-reliance, efforts to increase the size of land and other forms of wealth under the control of a household is a central theme in rural Pakhtun life. As a consequence, the Pakhtun must strive to acquire more. Acquiring more increases autonomy and hence status, and the ability to acquire thus reflects the capacity to demonstrate that they are Pakhtun. Men seek to acquire and hoard, to raise themselves, so much so that theft is seen to be a mark of self-reliance. The sale of land is dishonourable, and those who do so, or those who give up land in some other way are not ‘real’ Pakhtuns. For the Paktuns, then, control of land, as a form of wealth that proffers autonomy, is central to their personal and social identity.

A further demonstration of mastery is witnessed in gender relations. Women both reflect and affect the status of the patriarch within Pakhtun society, in particular because women have, through their actions, the power to shame their men. Women must therefore follow behaviour that upholds the socially determined honour of the patriarch and his household. As a consequence, men strictly control both the circulation of women and their activities. For the vast majority of women seclusion within the walls of the household is rigidly observed. If women venture beyond the household, seclusion can be maintained through the use of clothing that completely covers all parts of the body or through a variety of other practices. In many households however even this practice is discouraged. To further ensure the control of women marriage is endogamous, ideally between patrilateral parallel cousins. Deviation from these acceptable norms can, along with other reasons, result in extra-judicial execution at the hands of a close male relative.

The Pakhtuns are a patrilineal segmentary lineage society. This means that Pakhtuns trace their heritage to a common ancestor, through the male line. Pakhtun society differs however from other patrilineal lineage societies in the role played by agnatic rivalry. Land, which is culturally so central, is a fixed resource. Land is granted through the patriline, and is shared equally amongst sons. With land being the basis by which Pakhtuns demonstrate their self-reliance and autonomy, land rights and the inheritance of land become the basis of intense rivalry amongst close kin. This rivalry forms the core of Pakhtun society and social relationships. Segments of patrilines attach to plots of land. However, the members of a patriline, and particularly close members, are rivals for common plots of land. Father son relations have hostility embedded within them, as the son wants the land of the father and the father does not want to transfer the land to the son. Brothers vie with each other for land. Sisters and brothers vie with each other for land. Hostility is reinforced by the determination not to be dominated, the social acceptability of violence, and the fact that the social structure has no mediators to settle disputes. Segmentary systems of this type are ‘acephalous’, or headless.

However, each man has more than one close kin who is a rival for land. Patriarchs must therefore choose to construct alliances within the segment. The world is thus divided into those who are for, and those who are against (dullah). This duality structures all Pakhtun social relationships, from the tribe, through the village (khel) and right into the heart of the extended family. Tarbur means, literally, first cousin. It also means enmity. The most deadly level of violence is amongst tarburs because each claims the land of the grandfather. Violence thus has structural roots in conflicts over resources, but is represented in factional opposition concerned with the maintenance of honour. Of course, betrayal is always a threat, and alliances can always shift. Shifting alliances is a constant in Pakhtun life. One is never defeated, except by death; rather, alliances change. The exception is an external threat, for which rivalries are placed on one side the segment unites against the threat. A Middle Eastern saying describes it well: ‘I against my brother, my brother and I against our cousin, my brother, my cousin and I against the world’. The system has boundless capacity for fusion and fission.

Given these rivalries, and the fluid nature of alliances, leadership across patrilines only emerges from outside the patriline, and usually under circumstances of an external threat. Mystical religious leaders in particular can emerge in times of great crisis, combining spiritual and temporal authority. The mystical saviour comes from outside the formal, the orthodox: mullahs are not leaders in Pakhtun society. The Taliban were, to a degree, the last manifestation of this, given the fact that it was a movement of religious students, not religious leaders, seeking earthly power. However, just as with other such movements amongst the Pakhtuns, the exercise of secular authority, however limited, eroded the willingness of Pakhtuns to be led, and fostered resistance and opposition from within the Pakhtun community. This resistance was rooted in the need for autonomy and mastery over individual circumstances, not overarching political power. There is an unwillingness to concede authority over the individual, but this unwillingness is rooted in conflicts within localized social relationships, not conflicts concerning the nature of the state.

Although it is very important not to over-essentialise the role played by ethnic identity, it is nonetheless the case that understanding this social order is central in understanding how Pakhtuns will respond to the actions of the US in Afghanistan. First and foremost, there is no legitimate authority amongst the Pakhtuns. Certainly, the Taliban do not fit this role, any more than the PDPA did in the 1970s and 1980s or the feudal monarchy of Zahir Shah before that. The state does not regulate society, and there is no ‘civil society’ of which to speak. There is only shifting alliances that permit men to accumulate the social resources to demonstrate that they ‘are’ Pakhtun. The exception is the external threat, which temporarily binds together porous patrilines against a common enemy. This suggests that the US incursion into Afghanistan will have a dual effect: it will drive some Pakhtuns into a temporary alliance of convenience with the Taliban; and it will drive some Pakhtuns into a temporary alliance of convenience with the US. These alliances will not be about transforming the structure of governance in Afghanistan. They will be about the quest for advantage in localized conflicts amongst dullah within communities. As such, the alliances will not be stable. Indeed, the instability in the alliances is witnessed in the difficulty the anti-Taliban opposition has had in uniting tribal leaders under a single coherent strategy. While allied, the US will not be able to control the actions of the Pakhtun to which they are allied. Brutalities can be expected in a society open to casual violence and where blood revenge is socially necessary, especially against those deemed to be inferior such as non-Pakhtuns. While allied, the Pakhtuns will be totally reliable--until the point at which it is to their advantage in local disputes to no longer be reliable. That they will alter their alliances is foregone; it is only a matter of when, and when will be a function of changes in localized social relationships. The Uzbeks and Tajiks in the Northern Alliance know this; they know that Pakhtuns ultimately will never concede to their leadership, no matter what the type of leadership on offer, because to do so would be to concede mastery. The price of the temporary alliance will be steep indeed when alliances shift, as the logic of blood revenge takes hold.

Amongst those who stand with the Taliban against the US and its allies, the capacity to fight will be near limitless. The reason is not the role of the US in ‘occupying’ parts of the country. The tenacity of the Afghan resistance to the Soviets did not just lay in the occupation of the country by an outside power. It also lay in the fact that microscopic conflicts—tarbur against tarbur, khel against khel—could be played out against the backdrop of the Soviet occupation. War is a suitable terrain upon which to pursue mastery, because the pursuit can be conducted on many different levels at the same time. This helps explain why Afghanistan was never able to be brought under control by an outside power—not by the British in the 19^th century, and not by the Soviet Union in the 20^th century. The intensity of localized intracommunity conflict sustained collective resistance to imperial invaders.

Over 6000 people died on 11 September at the behest of a small group of fanatics who have no concern for life. Already, many more innocents have died as a result of the pursuit of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Within the logic of Pakhtun society, the outcome of the US intervention will be to alter the balance of forces between dullah and in so doing permit an intensification of factional violence even as the quest for advantage necessitates realignments and, eventually, revenge between and within communities. In a country that has been in a state of civil war more or less continually since 1974, the capacity of the current conjuncture to deepen the spiral of violence means that the US response is the wrong one.

As a consequence of the ongoing war and a four-year drought, a quarter of the population was at risk from hunger prior to 11 September. The situation is now worse. Afghanistan needs 52000 tons of food a month during the winter just to survive. Unicef estimates that an additional 100000 children may die during the winter because of the additional complications to already difficult relief work brought about by the US intervention. Are the lives of innocents caught in the inevitable cross fire of civil war, drought and US intervention a price worth paying? The fact that the US is willing to sacrifice the life of innocent and already brutalized Pakhtuns suggests two things. First, despite the rhetoric, the life of an Afghan is not worth as much as the life of an American. Second, that the quest for bin Laden is not about justice, it is about revenge. After Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo, welcome to the newest chapter in the development of the ‘new world order’. If the US government was interested in justice, it would be mobilizing its international allies to quickly establish the International Criminal Court in The Hague operational so that the terrorists could be brought before it, eventually, and tried for their crimes. That the US is not pursuing this option suggests it is out for revenge. It is a motivation the Pakhtuns understand very well; they are its masters. Perhaps the US is less different from the Pakhtuns than is apparent.