Stephen Burman

The scope of American ambition

It is natural to want to know exactly what American policy is in the crisis, as opposed to what may be said for public consumption. Our problem is that we do not and cannot know the answer. This is true despite wall-to-wall media coverage, which is as misleading as it is illuminating, as much agenda setting as it is analysis. Uncertainty is a great source of anxiety as the crisis unfolds.

It is relatively easy to understand some aspects of the crisis, even some that are not publicly announced. When Secretary of State Powell visits Pakistan to shore up their support the sound of a shopping list of demands on America being drawn up, not just there but around of the world, is not hard to discern. The much-vaunted grand coalition that the US is building up will come at a high cost, as country after country inserts its own agenda into negotiations. This will inevitably carry the US beyond its own agenda and accentuate the problem of unintended and controlled consequences emerging from the crisis.

The scope of American ambition is unknowable partly because policy making is an unfolding process whose aims cannot be easily summed up. Policy is partly the outcome of a struggle between different voices within the American state and the oscillation of American rhetoric since September 11, first warlike then measured and then aggressive once again signals which faction has the upper hand. What we can say is that the events are of such significance that they have taken US policy right back to basics and given rise to a fundamental re-evaluation of US foreign policy priorities. The most we can do is sketch the range of possibilities.

Let us employ a conventional distinction between a maximalist and minimalist approach. The latter implies restraint in the sense that, the United States will confine its actions to the precise aim of eliminating and/or bringing to justice the terror network responsible for the atrocities. This approach seeks to avoid the unintended consequences that will carry US policy spinning out of control and conforms to the publicly stated position of the administration. The fear is that behind this lies another, maximalist position in which the US uses the ‘opportunity’ presented by the events of 11 September to construct a world remade in its own image and likeness and to solve a raft of outstanding international problems under the guise of eliminating terrorism.

Where does Bush White House stand on this continuum? Before 11 September, its policies contained elements of both a minimalist and a maximalist approach. One the one hand, it employed a narrower definition of national interest than the Clinton administration and there was less concern for democratic enlargement, the promotion of human rights, economic equality, or for multilateral action generally. Bush favoured more targeted American engagement in the world, eschewed nation building and adopted a very cautious approach to the deployment of US troops abroad, especially in a peacekeeping role.

On the other hand, the Administration’s approach was unilateralist as distinct from isolationist. This implied that it would be willing to capitalise on the freedom given by its position as the sole superpower to further its conception of American national interest. This reflected a confident and ambitious approach that is at odds with the picture of a president who entered office knowing little and caring less about foreign policy. This confidence has long historical roots but America’s success in imposing its conception of globalisation on the world since the end of the Cold War has reinforced the universalist thrust of American foreign policy, as has success of its domestic economy. These factors have made it easier than ever for American policy makers to feel that, as the sole superpower and a model of economic success, they have the capacity and the right to extend their system across the world.

This tendency is reinforced by the self-image of the Bush foreign policy team who see themselves as masters of this game. These are the same people who advised Bush senior and who brought you the Gulf War. More importantly, they are the people who in their own view, engineered victory in the Cold War. For them the Clinton years were ones in which kids took over the running of foreign policy, with predictable results, a blip now rectified as they have taken up the reins again. It is their own perception of their record of accomplishment gives them the confidence to redraw the map of international affairs to reflect unprecedented American dominance. The initiative on National Missile Defence, which has the most far-reaching strategic implications, is the most obvious example of this. So is the rhetoric of war, which we have heard post 11 September, a device by which the attack on terror is transformed into and attack on a state - which is to say it is moved to a terrain where they have every confidence that they have the answers and the means for victory?

If this background suggests that the Bush administration is not one to shrink from a challenge however momentous, what has become of this perspective since 11 September?

A key effect has been on their unilateralism. There has been much talk of coalition building and much effort has evidently been put into it. I am sceptical as to the importance of this, however. The atrocities are seen by the administration as an attack on America and they reserve the right to respond as they see fit. The US approach to the coalition is entirely pragmatic; they will not be constrained by their partners when fractures start to appear as, over a long campaign, they are bound to do.

We should note in this context the surprising marginalisation of NATO, which, despite the invocation of the Article 5 mutual defence clause, is reduced to sending a few Awac planes to patrol the US coastline while US forces are on duty in the Central Asian frontline. Not exactly Dad’s army perhaps, but a less than glorious role nonetheless. We should also note the words of Richard Perle, former Under Secretary of State for Defence, and one who articulates in public the darker thoughts of the administration – he is known is Washington as the Prince of Darkness – who has said that he would rather do without the coalition and achieve what ‘we’ want than have the coalition and compromise ‘our’ aims to preserve it.

If the coalition is little more than a useful device, just as it was for Bush senior in the Gulf War, and if it is likely to fracture as the full agenda of the administration unfolds, what might we speculate that agenda to be? It is not necessarily all bad. American reliance on the cooperation of Pakistan may draw into the Kashmir dispute as an honest broker; relations with Russia could take a substantial turn for the better after the unprecedented cooperation shown on this issue; other so-called rogue nations that harbour terrorism might be forced to change their ways. On the other hand, cooperation with Russia might give it a free hand to pursue oppressive policies in Chechnya; taking the fight to Iraq, as some in the administration wish to do, might accentuate the alienation of the Muslim world.

The big prize however is a resolution of the Middle East conflict. The great puzzle here is why America cannot use the leverage it gains from financing Israel and other parties to force a just settlement. Part of the explanation lies in domestic politics, where the effectiveness of the Jewish lobby is notorious. However, the lobby has been effective in the past because it has operated in a sea of indifference on the part of the American public; this may change after the dramatic demonstration all Americans have had of how the Middle East conflict can affect their lives. New awareness may create a counterweight to the Pro-Israeli lobby and give the administration the political will to impose a just peace. One could wish that it did not have to take on the present Israeli government in which Sharon has already demonstrated his willingness to raise the stakes by driving the Palestinians to desperation and forcing the US to take sides.

More broadly, and echoing Tony Blair’s sentiment that "out of this evil, some good should come", it might be that the atrocities of 11 September will be the spur for America and its allies to address the causes of terrorism. This might in turn lead to moves towards greater global equality and respect for human rights; it might lead them not to abandon Afghanistan when the spotlight moves and to do a better job of nation building. Any hopes one might have of this nature are reinforced by the relatively restrained and measured way in which the US has gone about building its response. They have not retaliated in a blaze of anger and have shown some awareness of the sensibilities of others involved. The reason may be self-interest: the administration knows, as we all do, that lashing out in anger would be counterproductive because it would alienate Muslims across the world and create an army of Bin Ladens. Hence, the targeted bombing, the avoidance of civilian targets, the humanitarian aid, the insistence that this is not a war against Islam and the patient coalition building with Islamic countries.

And yet …. How much imagination does it take to put oneself in place of an Afghani grandfather on TV the other day saying he has done nothing to the US and yet their bombs have killed his grandson. When Blair and Bush make much of the niceties of targeting, do they think that their words have more impact on ordinary Muslims than the bombs? If a foreign power was bombing us and telling us on the radio that they were only targeting Hassocks and had no hard feelings against Brighton, would that make it all right?

The fear the current campaign generates is that the Americans are sleepwalking with eyes wide open in to an abyss. They know what the consequences of their strategy will be, but can do nothing other than pursue it to the bitter end. The sense of hubris surrounding the war is generated by the self-confidence I have already described and by their military tactics, which remind one of nothing so much a clockwork army being wound up to fight, as armies so often do, the last war. Bush in Afghanistan is the encore to Bush in the Gulf. However much we are told this is a new kind of warfare, if you are on the ground as the bombs come down it will feel very much like a distinction without a difference.

The American approach to this war is rapidly alienating the Muslim world with incalculable consequences. It is piggy backing the promotion of universal western values on a legitimate response to deranged acts of terror. The West vs. Rest mentality that surrounds the conflict is creating very ‘Clash of Civilisations’ they profess to avoid. They are turning Sam Huntington into a prophet. The major error in this is that is allows American Imperialism to become the issue rather than combating terror. In the process, it is dissipating the reserves of goodwill and sympathy that Americans rightly enjoyed in the immediate aftermath of the attacks in New York and Washington.

If this proves to be the path we are on, and if it is combined with a maximalist agenda in which America attempts to remake the world in its own image and likeness, the consequences are incalculable, including those for the internal stability of the societies who take the lead in this war. I hope that if this meeting were to be held a month from now the evidence would be that the USA has learned these lessons but on present trends, we have much to fear.