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The promises of international civil society: global governance, cosmopolitan democracy and the end of sovereignty?

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The present chapter returns full-circle to the starting-point of this book by considering contemporary debates on international (or global) civil society and its political promises. For over a decade since the end of the Cold War, scholars, observers, activists, and political practitioners have increasingly invoked the notion of 'civil society' in their discussion of global issues. Though characterised as much by disagreement and contention as by overlapping views, these discussions can be said to converge upon three associated dimensions of globalisation: global civil society, global governance and cosmopolitan democracy. Students of globalisation have generally included the transnational extension of activist networks as part of this process of 'space-time compression'. For their part, theorists preoccupied with the new forms of planetary political rule - or 'global governance' - underline the prominent role of civil society in the definition of this concept. Likewise, scholars concerned with the political challenges of globalisation have issued path-breaking arguments for a cosmopolitan democracy rooted in a transnational civil society.

The preceding chapters in this study have already indicated how the notion of civil society should be at the core of such discussions, independently of whether it is explicitly invoked or not. After all, as we have seen thus far, the rise and international expansion of civil society is germane to the explanation of those very structures like capitalism and state sovereignty that arguably underpin phenomena such as globalisation and global governance. But the fact that civil society figures so prominently in the recent literature on globalisation, governance and cosmopolitanism provides all the more reason for critically engaging with these debates. The concern of this chapter, therefore, is the place of civil society in the processes associated to globalisation and global governance, and indeed in the theoretical reflections on these processes. More specifically, the pages that follow aim to draw together the arguments on sovereignty, modern collective agency and the limits to international change made in preceding chapters, deploying them in the context of current debates on civil society and globalisation. The central argument of this chapter is that, contrary to the claims of most globalisation theorists, the concept of international (or global) civil society should not be exclusively or even principally associated to globalisation and the accompanying notions of global governance and cosmopolitan democracy. This is so for at least three reasons.

First, international civil society must be disassociated from globalisation because the former's existence long predates the advent of the latter process. This claim represents more than a simple backdating of the historical emergence of international civil society for it highlights the very modern properties of this category, thereby situating the relation between civil society and globalisation in the broader context of the socio-historical epoch we have come to identify as 'modernity'. On this account, globalisation represents the current phase of a wider historical process, one dimension of which was the expansion of international civil society since the late eighteenth century - a process which arguably set the terrain for contemporary 'global' civil society.

Secondly, international civil society should not be equated with a new, transnational domain of socio-political activity that acts as a democratic bulwark against the unaccountable institutions of global governance because, as will be suggested below, many agents of international civil society are themselves thoroughly

unaccountable and undemocratic. Again, far from being a purely contingent circumstance, questions surrounding the political legitimacy of agents in international civil society are intimately connected to the territorial character of modern political rule. Insofar as this is the case, it follows that democratic politics cannot so readily disown its historical connection with the institutions of state sovereignty. Put differently, undermining state sovereignty can be as detrimental to the objective of accountable, democratic politics as it is in some instances beneficial: many agents of international civil society, however, often fail to note that being 'non-governmental' does not mean being 'non-political' ie. that their actions, however 'transnational', necessarily impinge on existing, territorially-bounded 'communities of fate'. To that extent, and contrary to most discussions of civil society and globalisation, there is nothing intrinsically progressive or democratic about international civil society.

Finally, and following from the latter point, the expansion of international civil society should not be seen as heralding the end of state sovereignty and the concomitant rise of institutions of global governance built in interaction with a rising global civil society. As has been suggested throughout this book, the agents of international civil society are necessarily implicated in the reproduction of the inter-state system and to that extent must still formulate their demands with reference to the sovereign state, regardless of whether these demands are actually executed domestically through the national state or internationally via the institutions of global governance. This in not ignore the obvious interface between international civil society and the institutions of global governance - many social movements that operate within international civil society can and do engage with the institutions of global governance, and indeed influence the operation and policies of these institutions. Nor is it to underestimate how states have been forced to alter their structures and strategies to accommodate the challenges of globalisation. It is, however, to insist that the interaction between social movements of civil society and the institutions of global governance is still mediated through the structure of state sovereignty in ways that preclude the facile domestic analogy between the state and civil society on the one hand, and 'global civil society' as a counterpart to international institutions of global governance on the other. The interesting question in this context, therefore, is not so much 'is state sovereignty disappearing in the face of globalisation?', but rather 'how is the relation between state and civil society being reshaped internationally under the pressures of globalisation?'

This three-pronged critique of contemporary discussions on global civil society and global governance will proceed as follows: the first section surveys some of the more influential contemporary formulations of the nexus between globalisation and civil society. Thus, the work of Richard Falk on 'global civil society', that of Hardt and Negri on Empire and the end of sovereignty, and the writings on David Held on 'cosmopolitan democracy' will be taken as representative samples of how this juxtaposition is being theorised inside and outside the field of IR. A second part of the chapter develops the critical arguments summarised above, dealing in turn with the historical, sociological and political limitations to the prevailing conception of the relation between civil society and globalisation. Without wishing to negate the historical particularity and the political significance of this relation, a case will be made for a more nuanced approach to the interaction between 'global non-state actors'

and 'global governance'; one that places it within the broader historical process of the expansion of international civil society, and therefore recognises the political limits to the idea of 'global civil society' as it is presently conceived. Finally, due consideration will be given to the real normative promises that, however qualified, the idea of international civil society holds out for activists engaged in the politics of a globalising world. Here the claim is that by considering international civil society as a socio-historical domain intrinsic to the modern international system, a more sober, and therefore more effective assessment of the potential of global transformative agency will make itself available.

Civil Society and Globalisation

The idea of civil society has been invoked with reference to globalisation in at least three different though plainly inter-related contexts. First, there are those studies that see the growing economic, technological and cultural integration of a globalising world as spurring on greater co-operation amongst socio-political activists across the globe. From this perspective, globalisation is a process that is unifying political actors both 'from above' and 'from below' and to that extent we can group authors who take this view under the rubric of 'grassroots globalisation theorists'.

Tied to this view of globalisation as a process that fosters global grassroots solidarity is a second view on globalisation and civil society: one that sees activities of 'global' civil society as undermining traditional state sovereignty. On this account, the globalisation of capitalist production and exchange (ie. the globalisation of civil society) has forced states to transfer their sovereign functions in the management and regulation of socio-economic affairs onto international institutions of 'global governance' - particularly the United Nations (UN) and its specialised agencies. This in turn has encouraged social movements within civil society to displace the locus of transformative politics from a purely national to a global plane, thereby further abetting the transformation of the modern state's policy structures in accordance with these new modes of globalised contestation. I shall label the diverse group of scholars attached to this viewpoint as the 'global governance theorists'.

Finally, whether they agree in the detail of the preceding formulations of globalisation or not, political theorists such as David Held and Daniele Archibugi have accepted the existence of such a process as a starting point for rethinking the nature of democracy in a globalising world, and more concretely, developing the conceptual and practical mechanisms for the establishment of a 'cosmopolitan democracy' or 'cosmopolitan governance'. These authors recognise that there are both barriers and opportunities for the extension of liberal democracy inherent in the process of globalisation. But in so far as they generally welcome the erosion of the national state's sole prerogative over popular sovereignty, and advocate the increasing transfer of such sovereignty to various international multilateral bodies (principally the UN), these authors can aptly be classed as 'cosmopolitan democrats'.

It should be emphasised that this threefold classification of theorists serves a purely heuristic purpose. There is considerable overlap in the analytical interests of the various groupings, and their differentiation does not correspond to an agreement over the political or normative implications of juxtaposing globalisation and civil society.

With these caveats in mind, it is now possible to explore in greater detail these three different approaches to our subject-matter.

Grassroots Globalisation

For many globalisation theorists, the world-wide compression of time and space is a phenomenon that has engulfed all aspects of our social life, including political activism. On this view, the rise of specifically 'planetary' concerns such as ozone layer depletion or the international spread of AIDS/HIV has encouraged activists to organise and conceptualise their struggles on a global scale. Furthermore such transnational grass-roots activism is increasingly facilitated by the globalisation of audio-visual media, the popularisation of electronic mail and the Internet, greater international mobility (at least for those living in OECD countries) and indeed the increased familiarity with the globally dominant socio-cultural norms and values (such as 'human rights', 'democracy' or 'civil society') resulting from all these phenomena. The upshot of all this is clear for concerned scholars like Richard Falk

Such cumulative developments are facilitating the birth and growth of global civil society at this time. They carry the possibility of an extension of the movement for democratization beyond state/society relations to all arenas of power and authority, including international institutions [...] These expressions of globalization from below can be contrasted with a geopolitical approach to geogovernance, and amount to a multifaceted struggle to achieve a new equilibrium that reorients market and state to an extent that is nurturing toward both nature and its human inhabitants. Such reorientation embodies the spirit and substance of humane governance.¹

¹ R. Falk, *On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p.35. See also, by the same author, *Predatory Globalization: A Critique* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) and 'The World Order Between Inter-State Law and the Law of Humanity: The Role of Civil Society Institutions' in D. Archibugi and D. Held (eds) *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).

Falk is not alone in his sanguine appraisal of globalisation 'from above' encouraging an corresponding globalisation 'from below'.² We saw in Chapter 1 how many IR scholars (those labelled there as 'new transnationalists') have associated globalisation with a fresh wave of transnational activism which has signalled the rise of global civil society. Similarly, most recent studies of globalisation seem to include a requisite section or chapter on global or transnational civil society as an expression of grassroots globalisation that bears the promise of democratisation.³ Some theorists go even further in arguing that transnational social movement activity is politicising previously unexplored spaces in the international system. In his study of environmental movements and world politics, for example, Paul Wapner suggests that by refusing to limit their conception of political power to that exercised by sovereign authorities, such movements are actively generating new political spaces beyond the state-system: 'Activists pursue ... types of action that aim not to establish governmental institutions nor to dismantle existing ones but to enlist the governing capabilities of instruments available below, above, and at the level of the state. These instruments are part of global civil society, and by employing them activists engage in world civic politics.'⁴ Such a view has been echoed from different disciplinary and methodological starting-points by various other theorists (some discussed in Chapter 1 of this book), and in many respects it could be interpreted as a globalised rendition of the liberal 'republican' understanding of civil society briefly examined in Chapter 2. The relevant conclusion for present purposes is that these accounts of 'grassroots globalisation' not only recognise the extension of social movement activity beyond state boundaries but, perhaps more importantly, see this as prising open previously sealed arenas in world politics, thus gradually replacing the national state as the major locus of political power. In this respect, 'grassroots globalisation' theorists pave the way for the discussion of civil society and the international form of political rule that has come to be known as 'global governance'.

Civil Society and Global Governance

² See also R. Barnett, *Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994); P. Ekins, *A New World Order: Grassroots Movements for Global Change* (London: Routledge, 1992).

³ See, for example, Jan Aart Scholte, 'Global Civil Society' in N. Woods (ed) *The Political Economy of Globalisation* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).

⁴ P. Wapner, *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 19.

For many observers, a key outcome of globalisation is the gradual but irreversible erosion of the modern state as the sole depository of political legitimacy. This process is being accompanied by rise of what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have recently called a new 'constitution of Empire'. Under this new global juridico-political arrangement

Government and Politics come to be completely integrated into the system of transnational command. Controls are articulated through a series of international bodies and functions', while '[t]he global People [sic] is represented more clearly and directly not by governmental bodies but by a variety of organizations that are at least relatively independent of nation-states and capital. These organizations are often understood as functioning as the structures of global civil society, channelling the needs and desires of the multitude into forms that can be represented within the functioning of the global power structures.⁵

Again, other theorists have put this same point in different terms, with Stephen Gill, for example, speaking of the 'new constitutionalism' of 'disciplinary liberalism' where '[n]eoliberalism is institutionalised at the macro-level of power in the quasi-legal restructuring of the state and international political forms ... This discourse of global economic governance is reflected in the conditionality policies of the Bretton Woods organisations, quasi-constitutional regional arrangements such as NAFTA or Maastricht, and the multilateral regulatory framework of the new World Trade Organisation.'⁶ Without wishing to paper over the often radical differences in interpretation, it can nonetheless be said that, for our purposes, the overarching concern of these scholars is 'global governance'. Moreover, because of the multiple meanings attached to 'global governance', it may be worth highlighting just two inter-related dimensions of this category: its relation to state sovereignty and the place of civil society in its constitution.

Most approaches to the idea of global governance start from the premise that the processes of globalisation unleashed after the crisis of the 1970s forced OECD states to transfer political responsibilities previously allocated to the national state onto international multilateral institutions. According to one recent study of globalisation, '[t]here is little doubt that there has been a growing internationalization of political

⁵ M. Hardt and A. Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 311.

⁶ Stephen Gill, 'Market Civilization and Global Disciplinary Neoliberalism' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (Vol. 25, No.3, Winter 1995), pp. 399-423.

decision-making and of diverse aspects of global governance - that is there has been a marked extension of the infrastructures and institutions of global political networks, rule-making and activity.’⁷ As we shall see below, one shortcoming of such a formulation is the absence of a clear historical demarcation of when global governance was set in motion. This is worth underlining because in most accounts, the UN and its accompanying specialised agencies (including of course, the Bretton Woods institutions) are generally identified as the main depositories of those sovereign responsibilities ‘internationalised’ by the national state. Thus, global governance has become closely associated with the rise of ‘international regimes’ on say, the international drugs trade or human rights, monitored and regulated by the UN system. Insofar as this represents the gradual hollowing out of state sovereignty it must also have, according to the structural view adopted in Chapter 3, severe implications for the agents of civil society: for if the modern state is devolving its legitimate monopoly over political rule onto multilateral institutions, where do social movements of civil society target their socio-political grievances?

The answer for most theorists of global governance lies in the development of a global civil society that interacts with the multilateral institutions of the UN. Such a response was especially clear in the Commission on Global Governance’s influential report *Our Global Neighbourhood*: ‘At the global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs), citizen’s movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market.’⁸ This answer has however been replicated in numerous academic studies, the most sophisticated of which is perhaps the collection edited by Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss on *NGOs, the United Nations and Global Governance*. In their introduction to this volume, the editors suggest that,

In their own ways, NGOs and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) grope, sometimes co-operatively, sometimes competitively, sometimes in parallel towards a modicum of “global governance”. We define global governance as efforts to bring a more orderly and reliable responses to social and political issues that go beyond the capacities of states to address individually. Like the NGO universe, global governance implies an absence of central authority , and the need for collaboration or cooperation

⁷ D. Held, A.G. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 58.

⁸ Commission on Global Governance *Our Global Neighbourhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 2-3.

among governments and others who seek to encourage common practices and goals in addressing global issues.⁹

Global civil society therefore emerges from these readings as a domain that simultaneously reacts to the 'internationalisation' of the state and encourages the latter process. On this interpretation, the agents of global civil society fulfil a functional or 'operational' role as 'grassroots partners' of multilateral institutions in the administration of global governance. As such, they contribute to the shifting locus of sovereign power from the national state onto international organisations like the UN, thereby also 'politicising', as we saw above, new arenas of 'world civic politics'. In short, for theorists of global governance the agents of civil society play a crucial role in defining the former category because firstly, in adopting transnational socio-political causes (such as, for example the defence of women's rights) they foster the establishment of multilateral regimes that can manage global governance, and secondly because they lend popular legitimacy to such regimes by representing a putative 'global *demos*', or at the very least acting on behalf of assorted INGOs and global social movements deemed to be representative of an equally imaginary 'global public opinion'.

Civil Society and Cosmopolitan Democracy

While there is a perceptible, sometimes explicit, normative undercurrent to most of the analyses of civil society and global governance discussed above, the positive endorsement of globalisation as a process that can potentially extend liberal democracy across the world must be reserved for the group of theorists classed earlier

⁹ L. Gordenker & T.G. Weiss (eds) *NGOs, the United Nations and Global Governance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 17.

as 'cosmopolitan democrats'.¹⁰ The most comprehensive and influential formulation of this promise behind globalisation and its attendant institutions of global governance and global civil society, is that found in David Held's proposals for 'cosmopolitan democracy'. The work of Held is predictably complex and multifaceted. Moreover, it is characterised in equal measure by analytical and prescriptive (and therefore sceptical and optimistic) assessments of the democratising potential behind globalisation. There are, however, two basic claims in the cosmopolitan democratic agenda which are especially relevant to the present discussion on civil society and globalisation.

The first is Held's insistence that the dominant understanding of international relations - what he terms the 'Westphalian model' of sovereign states - severely limits the realisation of any democratic impulse that may lie behind civil society. For Held, the sovereign state continues to play a crucial role both in the analysis of international affairs and in the promotion and protection of democratic politics. Yet since the end of World War II, it has been subjected to a series of pressures through the process of globalisation which require thinking about democratic politics beyond the system of states: '[t]here cannot be an account of the democratic state any longer without an examination of the global system and there cannot be an examination of the global system without an account of the democratic state. The way forward is to transcend the endogenous and exogenous frameworks of the theoretical traditions which have informed hitherto the analysis of the modern polity and international relations.'¹¹ Moreover, 'Democratic institutions and practices have to be articulated with the complex arena of national and international politics, and the mutual interpenetration of the national and the international must be mapped.'¹² Thus, Held's initial premise in this context coincides with the theories of global governance considered above in

¹⁰ Representative texts include: Archibugi and Held *Cosmopolitan Democracy*; D. Archibugi, D. Held and M. Köhler (eds), *Re-Imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); and D. Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995). A version of this approach in Spanish can be found in G. Jáuregui, *La democracia planetaria* (Oviedo: Ediciones Nobel, 2000).

¹¹ Held, *Democracy and the Global*, p. 27.

¹² *Ibid.*, p.22

that it identifies democratic power with institutions both within and beyond the sovereign state. From this perspective, the world-wide extension of liberal democracy must be interpreted in a cosmopolitan vein as emerging through globally-constituted political institutions, or what Held terms 'a cosmopolitan authority system.'¹³

This association of cosmopolitan democracy and global governance leads to the second area where Held's analysis dovetails with our present concerns, and that is his emphasis on the role of civil society in sustaining any project for cosmopolitan democracy. Here, again, the objective is not to somehow subsume local, 'domestic' agents of civil society under an overarching global civil society, but rather, to transcend the 'inside/outside' dichotomy and channel the increasing interpenetration between discrete states and societies within an overlapping 'cosmopolitan legal framework.'¹⁴ For Held, this new legal framework is to be built upon '[a] network of regional and international agencies and assemblies that cut across spatially delimited locales.' Such a network in turn is sustained by '[n]umber of processes and forces, including: the development of transnational, grass-roots movements with clear regional or global objectives ... and the emergence and proliferation in the twentieth century of international institutions to coordinate transnational forces and problems, from the UN and its agencies to regional political networks and organizations.'¹⁵ Indeed, in outlining the institutional architecture of cosmopolitan democracy, Held identifies the '[a]rticulation of political institutions with the key groups, agencies, associations and organizations of economy and civil society, national and international' as one of the three basic requirements for such an experiment to become viable. Accordingly, he reserves a privileged role for global civil society in a proposed UN 'Second Chamber' of peoples.

Overall, therefore, it is clear that Held's proposal for a cosmopolitan democracy envisages a substantial role in the realisation of such a project for the internationally-organised agents of civil society. While accepting that other political actors and institutions - including the sovereign state - are essential in shaping the contours of a 'cosmopolitan authority system', Held sees transnational socio-political activism as one of the motors behind the democratic overhaul of the 'Westphalian model'. Furthermore, he assigns transnational social movements an important

¹³ Ibid., p.234.

¹⁴ Ibid., p.234.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.237.

function as mediators between the institutions of cosmopolitan governance and the corresponding cosmopolitan *demos*. In all these respects, Held's work overlaps with much of the grassroots globalisation and global governance literature examined above, and indeed imbues it with specific normative content.

Civil Society and the Limits of Globalisation

We have thus far seen how the idea and practice of civil society has been incorporated into recent discussions on globalisation and its attendant notions of global governance and cosmopolitan democracy. Notwithstanding the differences in emphasis and divergent areas of focus, it can reasonably be said that each of the three theories agree on two basic points about contemporary world politics. Firstly, that socio-political activists are increasingly organising transnationally, thereby shifting the sites of socio-political power and legitimacy above and beyond the sovereign state; and secondly, that these shifts in the locales of power are largely positive developments in the extension of liberal democracy and the enforcement of transparency and accountability at the global level. When making these claims, civil society is generally invoked in one form or another as a key component in the unfolding of these processes.

At one level, it would be churlish to reject these claims wholesale. Even the most sceptical of commentators have conceded that the last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the transfer of sovereign authority from the national state onto international multilateral institutions, ie. that institutions of global governance have acquired increasing political power.¹⁶ Moreover, it must be accepted that the exponential growth in the number of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) since the 1970s has been matched by their increasing presence in and influence over diverse aspects of international relations.¹⁷ To that extent, a broadly

¹⁶ See, *inter alia*, P. Hirst and G. Thompson, *Globalization in Question* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), especially chapter 8. Harry Magdoff and Paul M. Sweezy, 'Globalization - To What End?' Parts I and II, *Monthly Review* (Vol. 43, Nos.9 and 10, February and March 1992), pp. 1-18 and 1-19, respectively.

¹⁷ For the statistical breakdown see Held *et al.*, *Global Transformations*; Gordeneker and Weiss, *NGOs, the United Nations and Global Governance*; Peter J. Spiro, 'New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-Making Institutions' *The Washington Quarterly* (Vol. 18, No.1, Winter 1995), pp. 45-56; and P.

conceived notion of globalisation has indeed produced new frameworks of international political rule known as 'global governance' and a fresh wave of transnational socio-political activism which might reasonably be described as constituting a 'global civil society'.

The assumption throughout this book has been that these changes are real and substantial, and that they must therefore be explained. The underlying argument, however, has been that in order to do so we must take a deeper historical and sociological understanding of both the modern states-system and international civil society. Reference to globalisation, global governance and global civil society takes us part of the way, but not the full stretch: it may help to *describe* and narrow our focus on these new developments in world politics, but it will not adequately *explain* the phenomena in question. The idea of international civil society presented in this study on the other hand, aims to offer an explanatory account of how modern social movements have organised internationally and thereby shaped the modern international system. On this understanding, globalisation and its accompanying processes must be seen as part of the far-reaching structural transformations inaugurated by capitalist modernity. In particular, the inter-relation between civil society and globalisation should be analysed in the context of these changes which as we have seen, ushered in transnational socio-political activity long before the advent of globalisation. In sum, the debates over globalisation, governance and civil society explored above are plainly relevant to the notion of international civil society presented in this study; but as the following sections will demonstrate, in their current formulation, these debates suffer from three major shortcomings which severely weaken their explanatory power and limit their political promise as purveyors of global democratic change.

Willetts (ed) *'The Conscience of the World': The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System* (London: Hurst & Co, 1996).

Historical Limitations: The Legacy of Internationalism

One of the major areas of dispute in the debates on globalisation concerns the historical novelty of this process. For many, globalisation represents an epochal break in modern world history, signalling in fact, the transition to a post-modern global society where the accepted notions of sovereignty, politics, work, culture, time, space and so forth, are rapidly being undermined and replaced by the logic of a post-Fordist, de-centred and 'disorganized' capitalism. Other observers are more cautious in their assessment of the degree and scope of change, but even they recognise that the term 'globalisation' aptly captures a sense of socio-historical movement and transformation which has affected most parts of the world since at least the end of World War II.

There is no space here to consider in detail the various arguments surrounding globalisation and epochal change (although it is worth noting that they are often predicated on a progressivism and a technological determinism usually associated with a long-discarded 'vulgar' Marxism). It should however be clear from the argument presented thus far, that I consider 'globalisation' to be a temporal expression of, and not a qualitative alternative to capitalism in the same way that the 'new imperialism' of the late nineteenth-century or the first Cold War of the late 1940s and 50s were also manifestations of particular 'moments' in the history of capitalism. In other words, globalisation is recognised in this study as marking a distinct *phase* in the historical development of capitalism, and not as somehow representing an historical *departure* from the dominant system of capitalist social relations. This historical understanding of globalisation has significant implications for the present discussion of international civil society in at least two key respects.

Firstly, situating the process of globalisation within the wider development of capitalist modernity helps to underline the fact that the trans-boundary, transnational, or globalised socio-political activism so often and exclusively associated to globalisation is by no means historically unprecedented. As this study has indicated throughout, modern social movements have organised across, and sometimes above territorial political communities since at least the end of the eighteenth century. Indeed, it has further been argued that in some historical contexts (eg. European national unifications of the nineteenth century) modern social movements have been instrumental in constituting new, integrated political communities out of previously fragmented entities. At the very least, therefore, discussion of the role of social movements and civil society in the processes of globalisation should be mindful of the historical precedents to contemporary 'grassroots globalisation'.

Once again, this reminder is not aimed at discrediting those studies that identify very real modifications in the form and content of transnational social movement activity over the past three or four decades. Nor is it to suggest that such activity can simply be read off as the natural outcome of centuries of accumulated social movement experience. It is, however, to insist that these changes must be analysed in the context of a broader structural transformations of world politics since the seventeenth century, and that moreover, an adequate explanation of how transnational social movements emerge in the first place, and what their impact on

world politics might be, requires placing their activity within this longer historical time-frame.¹⁸ To take but one example: it would be a very weak, almost disingenuous account of contemporary global feminist activism that did not to consider the nineteenth and twentieth-century internationalist precedents to such activity. For it is arguably the first and second generation of international women's organisations that set out the ideological principles and mobilising frameworks which today make it possible for feminists across the world to pursue their global socio-economic and political objectives. Put bluntly, no amount of dedicated websites, conference networking or INGO umbrella groups can replace the legacy of 'classical' feminist internationalism as the major factor in explaining the existence of global women's movements today. However, in overemphasising the latter, seemingly post-modern aspects of global social movement activity (feminist or otherwise), 'grassroots globalisation' theorists tend to overlook the crucial legacy of more old-fashioned, quaintly modernist international social movements - an oversight which, as will be argued below, often carries significant political implications.

Secondly, identifying the temporal location of globalisation is crucial in divesting notions of global or transnational civil society from any direct association with claims about the end of state sovereignty. As was shown earlier in the chapter, many analysts of globalisation, especially those labelled here as 'grassroots globalisation' and 'global governance' theorists see in the consolidation of a global civil society the necessary erosion of state sovereignty. Yet it is, again, by looking back at the historical evolution of transnational socio-political activism that it becomes apparent how deeply implicated modern social movements are in the reproduction of modern state sovereignty. If the theoretical arguments and historical illustrations of previous chapters are in any way compelling, it should be clear by now that we cannot simply equate transnational activism, be it in an age of globalisation or otherwise, with the end of state sovereignty. In fairness, few globalisation theorists stake out their claims in such bold terms, but the underlying assumption in their discussions of global civil society is that the socio-political agents operating in this domain are contributing to the irreversible replacement of the national state as the major locus of political authority. Most globalisation theorists seem so engrossed with recent expressions of transnational activism, that they forget how historically, transnational socio-political activity has reinforced state sovereignty as much as it has undermined it. There is therefore little reason to believe that, as one influential commentator has put it, '[t]he

¹⁸ A representative example of an emphatically 'presentist' account of global civil society can be found in Craig Warkentin and Karen Mingst, 'International Institutions, the State and Global Civil Society in the Age of the World Wide Web' *Global Governance* (Vol. 6, No.2, April-June 2000), pp. 237-257.

growth of global civil society has, in tandem with the spread of supraterritoriality more generally, shifted the framework of politics away from its previous core principle of sovereign statehood.’¹⁹ Once the emergence and development of international social movements is traced back to the past two centuries, the current fixation of globalisation theorists with trans-boundary activism and its accompanying threat to territorial state sovereignty appears rather short-sighted. Indeed, recent studies on the historical evolution of ‘governance’ highlight the ways in which capitalist states have sought since the Industrial Revolution to co-ordinate and regulate the boundless dynamics of capital through liberal institutions of ‘global governance’.²⁰ From the very outset of industrial capital’s international diffusion, the ideas and institutions of what used to be called ‘liberal internationalism’ were fostering an global interstate *and* intersocietal consensus over the norms, rules and values which should regulate the international economy (or what is today known as ‘global governance’).

Globalisation, therefore, may be ushering in new combinations of relations between states and civil societies, but, in line with the arguments presented in Chapter 3, there is little sign that these changes are in any way structural changes. In other words, it is quite possible, as this study has endeavoured to show, to acknowledge the increasing incidence of transnational socio-political activism in international relations while at the same time suggesting that state sovereignty is a major structural determinant in the dynamics of the international system. Viewing the agents of international civil society *historically*, it has been argued, contextualises the current interaction between globalisation and civil society in ways that both explain the existence of a so-called ‘global civil society’, and severely qualify any claims about its contribution to the erosion of state sovereignty.

Sociological Limitations: The Politics of Accreditation

¹⁹ Scholte, ‘Global Civil Society’, p. 188.

²⁰ Craig N. Murphy has presented the most comprehensive version of this argument in his *International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance Since 1850* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994). For an equally historically-informed account of the evolution of governance see Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Changing Patterns of Governance: From Absolutism to Global Multilateralism’ in A.J. Paolini, A.P. Jarvis and C. Reus-Smit (eds) *Between Sovereignty and Global Governance: The United Nations, the State and Civil Society* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998), pp. 3-28.

The previous paragraphs focused on one initial shortcoming of recent studies surrounding civil society and globalisation, namely the historical myopia of much of this literature. Such historical insensitivity, it has been suggested, is of concern not only because it ignores the legacy of 'classical' internationalism in explaining the contemporary resurgence of transnational activism, but more seriously, because in so doing it underestimates the historically-forged structural relations between the agents of civil society and the institutions of state sovereignty.

It will be argued in the present section that something similar happens with the sociological content of globalisation theories of civil society. For as we saw above, no matter what their angle on the issue, globalisation theorists concerned with transnational civil society tend to make two highly contestable assumptions: firstly, that the latter domain somehow acts as a fairly homogenous, non-hierarchical and disinterested counterpoint to the power-driven system of states; and secondly, that global civil society is therefore representative of an otherwise marginalised 'global people's power' or a disenfranchised 'global citizenry' which stands outside the realm of inter-state relations. These two assumptions in turn generate inflated expectations about the possibilities of socio-political change through the participation of agents of civil society in the institutions of global governance. For, it will be argued, INGOs are far too heterogenous, unrepresentative and functional in character to act as collective agents of global structural change - at best, they may be seen as *part* of a broader international civil society, but never as sole representatives of this sphere of international relations. The transformative and representative limits of a global civil society thus understood, are especially visible when considering the role of NGOs and other 'grassroots groups' at international conferences and in their interaction with multilateral institutions. It is in this respect that 'the politics of accreditation' serves as a useful epithet with which to examine these limitations.

One index of the growing influence of civil society in international relations, it is often noted, is the increased participation of non-state actors in global governance. As we saw earlier in the chapter, global governance theorists such as Leon Gordenker and Thomas Weiss, have spoken of the 'pluralization' of this phenomenon through the incorporation of NGOs and other non-state actors into the governance process: 'Constituent NGOs working in different sectors can interact in these bridging organisations that furnish what otherwise would be absent - a forum for discussion and cooperation. As a consequence, grassroots groups get a voice and attempt to influence policy-making.'²¹ Similarly, in their recent study on the contestation of global governance by global social movements, Robert O'Brien, Jan Aart Scholte and Marc Williams have highlighted the development of a 'complex multilateralism' which, in response to such social movement pressure, 'has incrementally pluralised governing structures' so that, 'MEIs [Multilateral Economic Institutions] are moving beyond

²¹ Gordenker & Weiss *NGOs, the United Nations and Global Governance*, p. 27

their interstate mandates to actively engage civil society actors in numerous countries.’²²

The first thing to be said about these claims for the ‘pluralization’ of governance is that it is helpful, once again, to broach them within an appropriate historical context. As Gordenker and Weiss readily acknowledge, NGO participation in global governance can be stretched back to the founding of the International Labour Organisation in 1919 and the establishment of the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1946 - both, incidentally, in response not so much to ‘grass-roots’ activism but to the pressures emanating from a revolutionary *state*, Soviet Russia. It was the ECOSOC that laid down the terms of NGO accreditation at the UN which according to Peter Willetts ‘[determined] many of the main features of the system as it still operates today.’²³ The details of the UN Charter’s Article 71 setting out the conditions for NGO consultative status need not detain us here.²⁴ For present purposes, it is enough simply to underline how the ECOSOC framework for NGO consultative status has been the mainstay of those recent UN world conferences on

²² R. O’Brien, J. A. Scholte and M. Williams *Contesting Governance: Multilateralism and Global Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 2-3.

See also J.A Fox and L.D. Brown (eds) *The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs and Grassroots Movements* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998) and P. J. Nelson, *The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations: The Limits of Apolitical Development* (London: Macmillan, 1995).

²³ Willetts (ed) *The Conscience of the World*, p. 33.

²⁴ For detailed discussions of these principles see Gordenker & Weiss *NGOs, the United Nations and Global Governance*; D. Otto, ‘Nongovernmental Organizations in the United Nations: the Emerging Role of International Civil Society’, *Human Rights Quarterly* (Vol.18, No.1, 1996), pp. 107-141; and Willetts *The Conscience of the World*. For an update on the changes in the ‘politics of accreditation’ see Peter Willetts, ‘From “Consultative Arrangements” to “Partnership”’: the Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN ‘ *Global Governance* (Vol. 6, No.2, April-June 2000), pp. 191-212.

environment (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), human rights (Vienna, 1993), and women (Beijing, 1995) which have been so insistently portrayed as representative fora of global civil society. It is by focusing briefly on these conferences and their 'politics of accreditation' that a more sober perspective on the representative and transformative role of NGOs becomes apparent.

There is no doubt that the number and range of NGOs represented at UN world conferences has risen spectacularly since the Stockholm Conference on the Environment in 1972. Different studies cite hundreds of NGOs officially accredited and thousands unofficially represented at the various world conferences held since then, while the geographical and ideological scope of their representation has arguably also been extended. Moreover, regardless of their formal participation in official conference proceedings, the sheer number of NGOs attending such specialised conferences has made these events a focal point for both transnational 'networking' and in raising global awareness through media coverage. At one level, therefore, UN-sponsored world conferences have indeed occasioned the unique convergence of global agents of civil society.

Yet on closer inspection, the form, content and eventual outcomes of such gatherings are so heavily circumscribed by the interests of states, that it is difficult to see how the agents of global civil society can be said to be genuinely representative of an autonomous and undifferentiated 'global citizenry'. In this regard, the experience of world conferences during the 1990s suggests that, to adapt a phrase, 'global civil society is what states make of it'. In the first place, the geographical and political origins of NGOs has a considerable influence on whether they are granted consultative status or not by the UN. Thus, it is unsurprising that well-endowed INGOs such as Save the Children Fund, Amnesty International or Médecins sans Frontières, based in or originating from liberal OECD states, have generally secured an influential position at such meetings - especially at the crucial preparatory committee (*PrepCom*) stages - to the detriment of Third World NGOs with fewer material resources and more explicitly 'political' goals. One recent survey of three world conferences speaks of a *de facto* division of labour at the 1992 Rio Summit whereby

The NGOs more interested in networking, or lacking official accreditation, took advantage of the fertile ground for NGO exchange provided by the [unofficial] forums. The strongest, most active, and most effective lobbying organizations came from the North, while the South, often represented by Latin American groups, spearheaded the NGO networking. In the words of one NGO newspaper writing in Rio, "the Africans were watching, the Asians listening, the Latin Americans talking while the North Americans and Europeans were doing business".²⁵

²⁵ Anne Marie Clarke, Elisabeth J. Friedman and Kathryn Hochstetler, 'The Sovereign

Secondly, if national origin of NGOs plays an important role in limiting the geographical representation of global civil society at the specialised conferences, the interests of the host state are even more pronounced. The administrative and logistical obstacles placed by the Chinese authorities on participants at the unofficial NGO forum during the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women attracted much attention at the time.²⁶ But similar expressions of state interests influencing the composition of *PrepComs* and NGO groups accredited at the official conferences can be cited for almost every specialised conference since the Tehran Conference on Human Rights of 1968. Once again, therefore, and despite their best intentions, NGOs and social movements attending these world conferences are necessarily party to the inter-state power politics that inform these meetings, as their very presence is generally conditional upon the approval of states. In the last instance, as Kal Raustiala has noted with reference to international environmental regimes, 'NGO participation remains a privilege granted and mediated by states.'²⁷

Finally, a cautionary note must be struck regarding the social representativeness of many NGOs and other groups accredited at world conferences. Article 71 of the UN Charter and its subsequent amendments set out fairly comprehensive principles for NGOs seeking consultative status, including accountability to members, administrative transparency, a broad geographical reach and an issue relevance to the UN's remit. Yet in practice, because of the inter-governmental and largely functional nature of ECOSOC, the type of NGO granted consultative status tends to be 'representative' in a very narrow sense. Thus, organisations such as the International Organisation for Standardisation or Rotary International which in any other context would not usually be recognised as being socially 'representative' are currently accredited with Category I consultative status at ECOSOC. In other words, though these and other NGOs accredited by the UN may indeed be worthy in an 'operational' or 'functional' sense, they can hardly be seen as representing the emerging 'people power' of a transformative global civil society. In

Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights and Women' *World Politics* (Vol. 51, No. 4, October 1998), pp. 1-35, p. 12.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

²⁷ Kal Raustiala, 'States, NGOs and International Environmental Institutions' *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol. 41, No. 4, December 1997), pp. 719-740, p. 724. Or, as Clarke *et al* conclude, 'State sovereignty sets the limits of global civil society' *Ibid.*, p. 35.

the final analysis, NGOs are - as one would expect - only representative of their membership, and not of a global *demos* or the like, as some global governance theorists would make us believe. Furthermore, their legitimacy as representatives of 'grassroots' interests are ultimately sanctioned through the 'politics of accreditation' by states and their attendant inter-governmental organisations.

All these reflections plainly aim to throw a more sceptical light on some of the overly rosy accounts of how INGOs are 'pluralizing' global governance. But it would of course be wrong to suggest that INGO participation in world conferences and other expressions of global governance is inconsequential to international relations. As was already noted, UN specialised conferences and INGO participation in ECOSOC at the very least provide a forum for transnational activist 'networking' and perhaps more significantly, draw widespread media attention to the global agendas being addressed. In some instances, there is concrete evidence of NGO lobbying actually shaping the policy commitments arising out of these deliberations.²⁸ The point, therefore, is not to deny the impact of INGOs on global governance and the 'pluralization' of the latter (nor for that matter to place a blanket censure on all their actions) but rather to spell out the limits of such influence and the highly selective nature of such plurality.

So long as 'global civil society' is understood in a liberal sense as representing a sphere of grassroots consent and co-operation, there is little doubt that it features as a key component of global governance. Thus, on the prevailing liberal-internationalist understanding, global civil society is seen as a domain of consultation and cooperative participation. From such a perspective, socio-political change is necessarily limited by the existing international social structures, and the transcendence of such structures is acknowledged to lie beyond the purview of agents of civil society. As Lee-Ann Broadhead has pointed out

Through renewed faith in liberal ideology [proponents of global governance] would like to convince 'citizens of the world' that the end of the Cold War has miraculously left them with the power to influence decision-making, and that the likely result will be a more enlightened, peaceful and just international system. This power will be realized, however, only if these civil society organizations agree to work with

²⁸ See for example the essays contained in Fox and Brown, *The Struggle for Accountability* and the analysis of Paul J. Nelson, 'Internationalising Economic and Environmental Policy: Transnational NGO Networks and the World Bank's Expanding Influence' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (Vol. 25, No.3, Winter 1996), pp. 605-633.

international organizations and within the established rule of law to achieve change.²⁹

The fact that this consensual stance is not simply a matter of political choice or preference on the part of civil society agents, but rather a structural property of the current relation between global civil society and global governance is especially apparent when we consider the role of social movements and INGOs in what O'Brien *et al* have called a new 'complex' multilateralism.

In their comprehensive study of how the central Multilateral Economic Institutions (MEIs) of global governance (World Bank, IMF and WTO) interact with critical Global Social Movements (GSMs), O'Brien, Scholte and Williams highlight two telling features of this encounter. The first is that, though MEIs have during the 1990s been obliged to address the grievances of GSMs and under some circumstances, incorporate them into their decision-making mechanisms, they have done so under terms which do not compromise the overall MEI policy objectives and which therefore clearly place GSMs in a subordinate position within this 'partnership'. In line with Lee-Ann Broadhead's argument cited above, MEIs will engage with GSMs so long as the latter accept their operational function as subordinate 'partners' in the administration of global governance. In other words, GSMs tend to act as global agents in 'commissioning consent'.

The second characteristic of the MEI-GSM encounter according to O'Brien *et al*, is the deep political divisions among GSM, generally resulting from their distinct geographical and social positions in the international system. Thus, empirical studies on the impact of global feminist, labour and environmental activism reveal how these agents of civil society are not, as many 'grassroots globalisation' theorists often imply, united in a harmony of interests, but rather replicate the diverse social cleavages which characterise global capitalism. This may appear as an obvious point to make, but in the context of claims about an undifferentiated 'global civil society' representing a bulwark against an equally homogenised state-system, they bear repeating. More importantly however, these two aspects of the 'contest over governance' underline the structural limits to international change under an international system governed by state sovereignty and capitalist social relations. As O'Brien, Scholte and Williams conclude, while a transformation in the nature of global governance may be taking place in response to GSM activity

To date the transformation has largely taken the form of institutional modification rather than substantive policy innovation ... In the short run the MEI-GSM nexus is unlikely to transform either institutional functions or their inherent nature to any significant degree. In the longer run, there is the possibility of incremental change in the functioning ambit of these key

²⁹ Lee-Ann Broadhead, 'Commissioning Consent: Globalization and Global Governance'

institutions. Complex multilateralism has not challenged the fundamentals of existing world order, but it has incrementally pluralised governing structures.³⁰

These conclusions are of course tentative, and should never foreclose future possibilities of change. Insofar as incremental change and the 'pluralization' of governing structures bear some promise for the improvement of people's lives across the world, they are obviously worth struggling for. But such struggles must always be guided by an acute sense of the social structures that govern the international system and which therefore set limits to change through 'grassroots' participation in the institutions of global governance. A participation, which as the various studies cited above show, is characterised more by the obstacles it places in the way of significant change, than by the possibilities it opens up for the radical transformation of the international system.

Political Limitations: Democracy, Legitimacy and Communities of Fate

The foregoing sociological discussion regarding the representative and transformative limits to the liberal conception of global civil society as a sphere of 'grassroots' non-governmental activity is closely linked to the issue of the democratic potential of international or global civil society. For the latter concept, and the social domain it refers to, is generally assumed to be impregnated with the prospect of global democratic change. This is usually suggested in either of two (by no means incompatible) ways. On the one hand, some of the global governance theories explored above establish a correlation between the 'pluralization' of global governance and notions traditionally associated to liberal democracy such as accountability, transparency, legitimacy, representation or consent. On this reading, the more global governance incorporates the agents of global civil society, the more democratic it becomes. A second approach - the major focus of this section - is that adopted by proponents of cosmopolitan democracy. Here, the role of transnational civil society and global governance in the promotion of liberal democracy is more complex, as from this angle, cosmopolitan democracy is to be realised through the global articulation of myriad socio-political forces and centres of authority, not just those of global civil society.

Notwithstanding these differences, it will be argued that in both instances the association of democracy with the agents of transnational civil society is theoretically objectionable on two counts. First, because in questioning the legitimacy of the modern state as the main depository of political authority, these theories underestimate the need for democracy to be rooted in 'communities of fate': that is 'a

³⁰ O'Brien et al., *Contesting Governance* p. 3.

community that rightly governs itself and determines its future.’³¹ Second, and following on from this, in separating out forms of political authority like, for example, the sovereign state, from their broader position in the totality of socio-economic relations, such theories risk reifying civil society (be it local, regional or global) as the exclusive or principal sphere of democratic deliberation. However, as this book has stressed throughout, not only is it conceptually misleading to endorse such a rigid separation between state and civil society, but furthermore, it is also politically disabling because the sovereign state still represents the sturdiest base on which to build a genuinely democratic polity. In substantiating these claims, the argument will deal first with the proposals for cosmopolitan democracy which, being the more challenging of the two approaches to democracy and global civil society, will hopefully make evident the shortcomings of the other, more simple equation of democratisation with the ‘pluralization’ of global governance.

David Held has lucidly spelt out the predicament of contemporary democratic politics in the following terms:

[t]he problem, for defenders and critics alike of modern democratic systems, is that regional and global interconnectedness contests the traditional national resolutions of the key questions of democratic theory and practice. The very process of governance can escape the reach of the nation-state. National communities by no means exclusively make and determine decisions and policies themselves, and governments by no means determine what is appropriate exclusively for their own citizens.³²

As Held rightly suggests, democracy in its various guises has been historically tied to the notion of popular sovereignty invested in territorially-bounded national states. Under conditions of globalisation, however, this prevailing conception of democratic politics is compromised by a number of juridico-political, socio-economic and cultural ‘disjunctures’ which according to the author means, ‘[t]hat the concept of legitimate political power or authority has to be separated from its exclusive traditional association with states and fixed national borders ...’³³. In response to these changes, Held contends, democrats must embrace the possibilities opened up by the processes of globalisation and develop novel forms of theorising and implementing democracy

³¹ David Held, ‘Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order: Reflections on the 200th Anniversary of Kant’s “Perpetual Peace”’ *Alternatives* Vol. 20, No. 4, October-November 1995), pp. 415-429, p. 418.

³² Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, p. 16.

³³ *Ibid*, p. 22.

via interlocking structures of local, national and global governance ie. through a 'cosmopolitan democratic law'. Civil society, conceived as a domain of socio-economic and political interests outside the direct control of the state, is considered as a major building bloc of such a project at all the levels of governance.

In several important respects, Held's analysis of the contemporary democratic predicament and the 'disjunctures' that characterise it, is to be welcomed. For a start, his cosmopolitan imagination elegantly dispenses with the still pervasive notion that the modern state must be *nation*-state if it is to be legitimate. As is well know, very few so-called 'nation-states' are ethnically homogenous in ways that might justify this title, and most forms of nationality are artificially constructed by diverse administrative and ideological bodies of the state. There is therefore, no *a priori* reason (contrary to what most nationalists contend) why the 'community of fate' that is the modern state should coincide with a particular national or ethnic group - modern states are *national* states by virtue of historical and geographical contingencies which in great measure only endure through the imposition of a national identity by the state. Moreover, Held's proposals for cosmopolitan governance should be valued for audaciously concretising how such forms of governance might operate in reality - whatever other criticisms might be levelled at such proposals, they do at least display the empirical courage of their theoretical convictions.

There is, however, a central tension in Held's account of cosmopolitan democracy which is arguably irresolvable so long as the structural relations that underpin global capitalism are not fully recognised. And this determining contradiction is that between, on the one hand, the modern democratic struggle for collective autonomy and human self-realisation in the context of a delimited political community, and on the other, the boundless quest for surplus-value which characterises the global reproduction of capitalism. Held is of course, keenly aware of this tension - it is in fact the key problematic underlying *Democracy and Global Order*, and indeed that of most recent political theory which engages with 'the international'. Yet in characteristically liberal fashion, he reduces capitalist social relations to one of seven sites of power - that of 'production' or 'economics' - thereby foregoing the opportunity to associate the various disjunctures explored to the dynamics of a broader totality of *social* (not just 'productive' or 'economic') relations which characterise capitalism. In other words, Held fails to establish the crucial link between the structural requirement for capitalism to constantly generate surplus-value and the diverse socio-historical disjunctures which he rightly claims define the contemporary democratic predicament. This in turn leads - crucially - to a misplaced emphasis on the 'Westphalian model' of sovereignty as the major source of such a predicament, and not on the broader system of surplus appropriation responsible for the disjunctures of globalisation. Held, in short, falls into the trap of fetishising the political expressions of global capitalism by assuming that the political forms of rule it throws up can be transformed in isolation from the social relations that underpin this system.

Far from representing a minor (and predictable) theoretical quibble between liberal and Marxist notions of 'production' or 'social relations', these considerations are germane to the present discussion in that they underline how even projects for a cosmopolitan democracy will be unable to overcome the 'disjunctures' generated by

global capitalism unless they address the structural basis of that mode of production. To use Held's own terminology, insofar as global capitalism necessarily feeds off 'autonomous' social relations³⁴, the challenge for any project of cosmopolitan *democracy* lies not so much in the re-articulation of political community, but in the overhaul of the social relations that generate such 'autonomy' in the first place. In other words, so long as it is *capitalist* social relations that are being regulated, no amount of global governance will do away with the 'autonomous' relations that characterise the contemporary international system. On the other hand, a democratic empowerment of the sovereign state can at least begin to redress the 'asymmetric production and distribution of life-chances' under capitalism. For whereas the autonomy and self-realisation of the capitalist ruling class is secured whenever it is able to accrue surplus-value through the market, that of exploited classes is much more dependant on the democratic rights (both positive and negative) procured by the sovereign state. One of the unique properties of capitalism is, as Justin Rosenberg has suggested, that 'It is now possible, in a way that would have been unthinkable under feudalism, to command and exploit productive labour (and natural resources) located under the jurisdiction of another state.'³⁵ In contrast, however, it is much harder for a citizen or subject of one state to share in the rights and benefits of another state.³⁶ In other words, the 'disjuncture' between political and human emancipation which Marx once identified as being axiomatic to civil society is replicated in the international domain with the discrepancy between the freedom of capital to reproduce itself through a borderless 'global economy', and the existence of discrete political communities which set limits on the power of citizens to exercise democratic control of their 'life-chances' under that set of global social relations. This predicament is especially invidious when we consider how closely the 'life-chances' of those members

³⁴ '[t]he asymmetrical production and distribution of life-chances which limit and erode the possibilities of political participation', *Ibid.*, p.171.

³⁵ J. Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations* (London: Verso, 1994), p. 129.

³⁶ The obvious and important exception to this is, of course, the European Union. Impressive as the advance in Union-wide citizenship rights has been, however, such rights still lag far behind the right of European capital to exploit the single market created by the Union. Even more seriously, the rights and benefits secured by the European Union are exclusive to citizens of member-states.

of a particular political 'community of fate' are conditioned by the virtually footloose dynamics of global capital.

By arriving at these conclusions it is not being suggested that the dynamics of global capitalism cannot or indeed are not being regulated by institutions of global governance. They clearly are, and often to the benefit of exploited classes. Cosmopolitan democracy however, cannot - as Held would no doubt readily agree - be reduced to a mere regulation or administration of the disjunctures thrown up by capitalist globalisation. It must also, and fundamentally, entail the exercise of autonomy and self-realisation through a legitimate political community. For Held, the sovereign 'Westphalian' state can no longer fulfil the exclusive role of legitimate political community, and in its stead democrats must now conceive of forms of cosmopolitan governance where, 'People would come ... to enjoy multiple citizenship - political membership in diverse political communities which significantly affected them. They would be citizens of their own immediate political communities, and of the wider regional and global networks which impacted upon their lives.'³⁷ Attractive as this proposal is in theory, the claim made thus far is that that is unlikely to be realised under existing system of social relations where the struggle for democratic rights of exploited classes is still principally mediated through the institutions of state sovereignty. Paradoxical as it may seem, the firmest guarantee against global extension of exploitation and alienation (or to use Held's terms, the loss of self-determination and autonomy) lies in strengthening the democratic sovereign state. Naturally, this should not undermine the cosmopolitan ambition of eventually transcending the artificial division of humanity into distinct national states - cosmopolitanism has and should continue to be a fundamental democratic value. But, if the arguments explored above carry any weight, it would appear that a cosmopolitan democracy can only be realised once the class relations which define capitalism have been superseded, and that aspiration, it has been further argued, is best secured through internationalised struggles for the democratic sovereignty of states.

The foregoing disagreements with Held's formulation of cosmopolitan democracy essentially revolve around his understanding of capitalist social relations and the strategic place of the sovereign state in the pursuit of cosmopolitan democracy. In other key areas, however, the arguments presented in this book coincide and are therefore sympathetic with the broad objectives of cosmopolitan democracy. Much of this agreement rests on Held's nuanced view of civil society as a sphere of social life which not only produces hierarchical and antagonistic social relations, but which must consequently also be balanced by the socio-economic and political intervention of the state if democracy is to be sustained. Translated onto the international sphere, what this amounts to is an equally cautious assessment of the democratic potential of global civil society.

³⁷ Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, p. 233.

The same can unfortunately not be said about other discussions of global civil society and democratisation. As was noted in the earlier survey of globalisation literature, many grassroots globalisation and global governance theorist uncritically equate the global expansion of civil society and its attendant insertion into the processes of global governance with the improved prospects for democratisation. Yet as the discussion thus far has emphasised, there is nothing inherently democratic in the global reproduction of civil society, either within states or internationally through the institutions of global governance. As this study has argued throughout, the expansion of international of civil society certainly opens up political spaces for democratic change, but such democratic openings must be seized and articulated by specific social movements - often against other agents of civil society - and their potential ultimately realised through the institutions of a specific form of political authority, usually the sovereign state. Two issues in particular should therefore be borne in mind when considering the relations between global civil society and democracy: the one relating to the legitimacy of agents global civil society; the other to the anti-statist pitfalls attached to this latter category.

Central to any conception of democratic association worth its name is the collective deliberation over the affairs that impact upon the life-chances of its members, and the subsequent commitment to the legitimate use of authority in the implementation of such decisions that arise out of these deliberations. The notions of constituency, consent, legitimacy, constitutional procedure - in short, the idea of a democratic 'community of fate' explored above - are usually invoked in this context. The problem of contemporary democratic politics as we also saw above, is that the 'fate' of particular communities is no longer (if it ever was) determined within the bounds of the prevailing form of political community - the national state. Furthermore, it is argued, the past decades have witnessed the rise of alternative political associations to that of the national state in the shape of, for example, the European Union, while global governance has given rise to institutions which might provide the embryonic structures for the growth of even more radically alternative modes of political community. It is in the context of these perceived changes that the assorted social movements, NGOs and advocacy groups usually encompassed under the concept of 'global civil society' are identified as the potential democratic representatives of these emerging forms of political association.

Independently of whether such transformations are illusory or not, the democratic claims in favour of global civil society immediately raise thorny questions about its agents: who are the constituents of global civil society? How has their mandate been legitimated? What is the remit of their representation? How can their actions be made accountable?

The sensible response to these questions is of course that there can be no single, general answer: the agents of global civil society claim to represent different (often incompatible) constituencies; their mandate is (as we saw above) either legitimated through the inter-state 'politics of accreditation' or simply self-arrogated by virtue of being present at specialised world conferences; their remit is determined by factors ranging from state sponsorship (in the case of GONGOs) to resolutions voted by a membership at annual conventions; while their accountability depends to a great extent on the internal arrangements of each organisation and the willingness of other

agents - be it 'public opinion', the media or indeed the fiscal authorities - to scrutinise civil society activism.

One thing, however, does transparently emerge from these interrogations, namely that it is precisely the absence of an overarching constitutional or procedural framework to guide the democratic deliberations of a putative global civil society that renders this domain unrepresentative in a political sense. However much individual INGOs and global social movements may have contributed to the extension of democratic politics across the world, they do not currently possess the requisite degree of legitimacy and accountability to be considered as democratic representatives in a globalised political community. It should hastily be added that INGOs and social movements do not generally claim such a status themselves, and that the preceding arguments are therefore targeted at theorists and practitioners that envisage such a role for INGOs and other agents of civil society in their proposals for global governance. This said, it is worth underlining once more how this 'democratic deficit' within global civil society further strengthens the case presented above in favour of the sovereign state's continuing potential as the site of democratic change. For however imperfect and limited its powers over the political fate of its citizens, the democratic sovereign state and the agents of civil society that operate within it, can at least rightfully claim to be democratically representative of their respective constituencies.

A second arena where the democratic credentials of global civil society must be closely scrutinised lies in the policy impact of INGO and other global social movement activity. For several years after the end of the Cold War, these agents of global civil society figured very prominently in the processes of 'democratisation' and 'reconciliation' across Central America, Southern Africa and South East Asia. The mushrooming of NGOs and other 'advocacy groups' in these regions during the 1990s was enthusiastically embraced by many liberals across the world as heralding the consolidation of civil society in previously 'totalitarian' or 'authoritarian' revolutionary states. Other commentators and activists, however, soon became more circumspect about this particular reading of the international expansion of civil society. (It is said that in the early 1990s an article circulated in Central America entitled 'How to Get Rich Quick in the 1990s: the Rise of NGOs in Central America'). Indeed it would be fair to say that ten years on, and with the inevitable benefit of hindsight, the balance has shifted toward a far more critical, even dismissive view of INGO activity in the promotion of democracy and other social goods. Thus, James Petras for example, summarised the view on NGOs of many on the Left in the following fashion:

In reality, non-governmental organizations are not non-governmental, They receive funds from overseas governments or work with private sub-contractors of local governments. Frequently they openly collaborate with governmental agencies at home or overseas. This 'subcontracting' undermines professionals with fixed contracts, replacing them with contingent professionals. The NGOs cannot provide the long-term comprehensive programs that the state can furnish. Instead they provide limited serviced to narrow groups of communities. More importantly, their programs are not accountable to the local people but to overseas donors. In

that sense NGOs undermine democracy and their elected officials to create dependence on non-elected, overseas officials and their locally anointed officials.³⁸

Petras' criticisms are in some respects unwarranted and inconsistent: overseas governments are often more transparent and democratic in their role as donors than local (also often unelected) officials or agencies. Similarly, NGO programmes can hardly be said to be replacing the 'comprehensive programs that the state can furnish' in the many regions where the state and its programmes don't exist in the first place! Yet plainly his stance also reinforces some points on democracy and civil society made implicitly or explicitly throughout this chapter, three of which bear repeating.

First, the transnational activities of NGOs and other agents of global civil society must be analysed in the context of the broader dynamics of capitalist social relations. In this respect, they must be seen as fully-fledged political actors that carry with them ideological biases and class interests which in turn affect (sometimes decisively) the socio-economic and political fate of particular states. In her excellent account of the international dimensions of civil society activism in Central America during the 1990s, Laura Macdonald documents how the diverse NGOs and social movements were heavily implicated in the tumultuous process of 'democratisation' in that region, concluding that, 'NGO behaviour is neither completely determined and impotent nor substantially autonomous - instead it is a contested political terrain where various actors (both national and international) vie for influence. The results of these contests will depend on the overall balance of forces within specific social formations ...'³⁹ This view has increasingly become accepted within the specialised literature on civil society and democratisation, particularly in the Third World.⁴⁰

Secondly, and as a result of their involvement in the wider complex of socio-political relations, INGOs and other agents of global civil society are often purveyors

³⁸ James Petras, 'Imperialism and NGOs in Latin America' *Monthly Review* (Vol. 49, No. 7, December 1997), pp.10-27, p. 13. Italics in the original.

³⁹ L. Macdonald, *Supporting Civil Society: The Political Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Central America* (New York: Macmillan, 1995), p. 153.

⁴⁰ See for example S. Carapico, *Civil Society in Yemen: A Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and G. Clark, *The Politics of NGOs in South-East Asia: Participation and Protest in the Philippines* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998).

if anti-democratic *laissez-faire* policies. For if by 'democracy' it is meant not only the protection of 'negative' civil liberties like the freedom of speech or the right to due process, but also the development of 'positive' rights to employment, housing, education, social security and so forth, then clearly the record of many agents of civil society is thoroughly undemocratic. Indeed several recent studies (both empirical and conceptual) have made a powerful case for equating the global extension of civil society with the forceful imposition of neo-liberal economic policies.⁴¹ The institutions of global governance, therefore, have increasingly and unashamedly promoted this liberal vision of global civil society as a domain that can be utilised or, as we saw above, 'operationalised' in the project of universalising capitalist rationalisation and exploitation. Insofar as the interventionist institutions of the state are seen to stand in the way of such universalisation, global civil society becomes a useful tool of this anti-statist, laissez-faire and ultimately undemocratic project.

Finally, the political dangers of such anti-statist uses of global civil society lie, paradoxically, in their potential obliteration of that very civil society. For, as this book has consistently argued, one of the most damaging conceits of liberal views of civil society is the notion that this is a domain always and everywhere threatened by the power of the state. Yet both empirically and conceptually, a thriving, democratic civil society (liberal or otherwise) requires the legitimate regulation through the authority of the state. Historically, civil society in all the dimensions examined in Chapter 2, has emerged and developed under the aegis of a legitimate and extensive state. Clearly, this is not to say that strong and powerful states have always generated equally dynamic civil society; it is however, to suggest that where the structures of state authority are weak or non-existent, the prospects of modern civil society are very bleak indeed. To the extent that democratic politics - whatever their ideological hue - can only survive in the context of an enduring civil society (global or otherwise), the democratic agents of civil society have an interest in supporting a robust and operative state.

Conclusions: The Promises of International Civil Society

The preceding pages have staked out the various limitations of different contemporary conceptions of the relation between globalisation and civil society. It has been argued that current usages of the term 'global civil society' are unsatisfactory in three respects: they suffer from an ahistorical 'presentism' that overlooks the crucial explanatory legacy of internationalism and the deep implication of transnational social movements in the formation of the sovereign state; they uncritically embrace non-representative, functional and democratically unaccountable INGOs as agents of

⁴¹ See for example, Tom Young "A Project to be Realised": Global Liberalism and Contemporary Africa' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (Vol. 24, No. 3, Winter 1995), pp. 527-546.

socio-political change within a putative global civil society; and finally, they therefore invest inflated expectations in a liberal global civil society as an international force of democratic politics. Underlying these shortcomings, it has been suggested, is a generally unacknowledged liberal conception of sovereignty and the market (or the 'political' and the 'economic') which underestimates the structural relations between these two spheres and which consequently underplays the potentially progressive role of state sovereignty in democratically transforming the global capitalist system.

Most of this chapter has been taken up with critical surveys of other people's views on globalisation and civil society. It is now necessary, therefore, to conclude with a positive statement on what the idea of international civil society presented in this study offers the contemporary analyst and activist. In particular, given the growing use of the concept in strategic discussions on how to effect global political change, it is important to identify the possibilities for radical socio-political transformation emanating from international civil society as it has been understood in this book.

International civil society was defined in Chapter 2 as a realm of socio-political activity created domestically and internationally by the expansion of capitalist social relations, where modern social movements pursue their stated goals. Cast in this light, the various agencies associated to the rise of a global civil society - INGOs, transnational advocacy groups, global social movements and so forth - can readily be encompassed by the category 'international civil society'. In most respects, these forms of socio-political mobilisation are not significantly distinct from their nineteenth and twentieth-century predecessors, and in that sense they can, as Chapter 3 suggested, be considered as the latest generation of internationalist organisations that have operated across established political borders. The crucial difference between the usage of civil society defended here and that proposed by the various globalisation theorists discussed earlier, therefore, revolves not so much around what transnational agents are included within this domain, but rather how they are related to other spheres of social life. On the definition offered here, international civil society is considered as an arena of antagonistic class relations where conflicting socio-economic interests and rival political programmes contend for power. This political competition between social movements unfolds in a context constrained by the structures of capitalism and state sovereignty, but it does so on an international plane that aims to cut across existing state boundaries. As such, international civil society is a political terrain which radical social movements must seek to understand and occupy for the purposes of genuine democratic transformation on a global scale. In particular, those socialists which still aim to transcend the existing capitalist system and undermine the power of its various political forms, must recognise the importance of this contested realm of world politics. For while the socialist tradition has from the very outset been premised on the theory and practice of working-class internationalism, it is not alone in this articulation of transnational or transboundary socio-political activity, and as such faces stiff competition from equally internationalist rivals. Socialists would therefore do well to appropriate international civil society both conceptually and politically as a domain which generates class struggles capable for being harnessed to the project of global socialist transformation. In sum, and in contrast to prevailing theories of global civil society examined above, the theory of international civil society presented here

insists on the politically competitive and socially antagonistic nature of this domain, thereby reinforcing the claim that it is an sphere of the international system which progressive politics cannot afford to ignore or disdain.

Assuming that this latter point is accepted, the question still remains as to whether the forms of mobilisation pioneered and developed by 'classical' internationalism are of any political relevance today. In other words, have the processes of globalisation rendered working-class, feminist, or Third World internationalism obsolete? The answer intimated throughout this book and this chapter in particular has been a fairly emphatic 'no'. So long as globalisation is considered as an expression of capitalism and not an alternative to it, the structure of social relations that underpin this system - whether globalised or not - in essence remain the same as those that informed say, 'new' capitalist imperialism of the late nineteenth-century. This is not to say that the way in which the structural relations between the state and civil society have played themselves out have remained unaltered by processes associated to globalisation. Clearly, the transfer of political authority to multilateral agencies which was examined above under the rubric of global governance has shifted various political expressions of class struggle - such as, for example, over minimum wages, industrial policy or equal opportunities - onto the international sphere. But it should once again be noted that in most instances, such transfers in regulatory authority are not historically unprecedented, and more importantly, that they still remain the essential prerogative of the sovereign state and the social forces that operate within its boundaries. Contrary to some readings of this phenomenon (especially those emanating from the Left), global governance mostly serves to resolve domestic class struggles through a recourse to international norms, which are in turn legitimated by nationally-based class forces. To take two examples: Mexico's adoption of neoliberal policies during the 1980s and 90s and its later accession to the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) should be read as an expression of the domestic class interests represented by the then President Salinas de Gortari. In so far as the multilateral institutions of global governance were involved in these policies, they did so as dependent instruments of the Mexican ruling class and not vice-versa; there may, to be sure, have been a harmony of interests between Washington and Mexico City, but the political and socio-economic benefits to be made out of Mexico's endorsement of the so-called 'Washington consensus' were largely accrued by the Mexican ruling class, and not by economists at the Bretton Woods institutions.⁴² Likewise, the critical intervention of the OECD and the ILO in favour of opposition (south) Korean Confederation of Trade Union during the winter strikes of 1996-97 underlines how the institutions of global governance can also serve to legitimate working-class victories domestically. In sum, globalisation may have

⁴² See the interesting study of this period by Susanne Soederberg, 'State, Crisis, and

Capital Accumulation in Mexico' *Historical Materialism: Research in Critical Marxist*

Theory (forthcoming 2001).

changed some of the *forms* of state-civil society relations by, for example, shifting the sites of decision-making and regulation onto international multilateral bodies; but it has not decisively altered the *content* of the structural relations that underpin capitalism as a system which differentiates a private sphere of surplus production and extraction called the market (or civil society) from a public domain of sovereign juridico-political authority (the state). To the extent that this structural separation, and the exploitative relations that underpin it continue to determine class politics across the world, any radical transformation of the international system will have to be premised on the increased politicisation of civil society on an international scale. And it is the practices and principles associated to internationalism in general, and socialist internationalism in particular which arguably continue to furnish the most robust legacy in the pursuit of this objective. For as this book has endeavoured to show, the history of the modern world has in large measure been shaped by similar internationalist activism within the distinctive sphere of international civil society.

¹ R. Falk, *On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p.35. See also, by the same author, *Predatory Globalization: A Critique* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) and 'The World Order Between Inter-State Law and the Law of Humanity: The Role of Civil Society Institutions' in D. Archibugi and D. Held (eds) *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).

² See also R. Barnett, *Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994); P. Ekins, *A New World Order: Grassroots Movements for Global Change* (London: Routledge, 1992).

³ See, for example, Jan Aart Scholte, 'Global Civil Society' in N. Woods (ed) *The Political Economy of Globalisation* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).

⁴ P. Wapner, *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 19.

⁵ M. Hardt and A. Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 311.

⁶ Stephen Gill, 'Market Civilization and Global Disciplinary Neoliberalism' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (Vol. 25, No.3, Winter 1995), pp. 399-423.

⁷ D. Held, A.G. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 58.

⁸ Commission on Global Governance *Our Global Neighbourhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 2-3.

⁹ L. Gordenker & T.G. Weiss (eds) *NGOs, the United Nations and Global Governance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 17.

¹⁰ Representative texts include: Archibugi and Held *Cosmopolitan Democracy*; D. Archibugi, D. Held and M. Köhler (eds), *Re-Imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); and D. Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995). A version of this approach in Spanish can be found in G. Jáuregui, *La democracia planetaria* (Oviedo: Ediciones Nobel, 2000).

¹¹ Held, *Democracy and the Global*, p. 27.

¹² Ibid., p.22

¹³ Ibid., p.234.

¹⁴ Ibid., p.234.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.237.

¹⁶ See, *inter alia*, P. Hirst and G. Thompson, *Globalization in Question* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), especially chapter 8. Harry Magdoff and Paul M. Sweezy, 'Globalization - To What End?' Parts I and II, *Monthly Review* (Vol. 43, Nos.9 and 10, February and March 1992), pp. 1-18 and 1-19, respectively.

¹⁷ For the statistical breakdown see Held *et al.*, *Global Transformations*; Gordenker and Weiss, *NGOs, the United Nations and Global Governance*; Peter J. Spiro, 'New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-Making Institutions' *The Washington Quarterly* (Vol. 18, No.1, Winter 1995), pp. 45-56; and P. Willetts (ed) *'The Conscience of the World': The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System* (London: Hurst & Co, 1996).

¹⁸ A representative example of an emphatically 'presentist' account of global civil society can be found in Craig Warkentin and Karen Mingst, 'International Institutions, the State and Global Civil Society in the Age of the World Wide Web' *Global Governance* (Vol. 6, No.2, April-June 2000), pp. 237-257.

¹⁹ Scholte, 'Global Civil Society', p. 188.

²⁰ Craig N. Murphy has presented the most comprehensive version of this argument in his *International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance Since 1850* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994). For an equally historically-informed account of the evolution of governance see Christian Reus-Smit, 'Changing Patterns of Governance: From Absolutism to Global Multilateralism' in A.J. Paolini, A.P. Jarvis and C. Reus-Smit (eds) *Between Sovereignty and Global Governance: The United Nations, the State and Civil Society* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998), pp. 3-28.

²¹ Gordenker & Weiss *NGOs, the United Nations and Global Governance*, p. 27

²² R. O'Brien, J. A. Scholte and M. Williams *Contesting Governance: Multilateralism and Global Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 2-3. See also J.A Fox and L.D. Brown (eds) *The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs and Grassroots Movements* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998) and P. J. Nelson, *The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations: The Limits of Apolitical Development* (London: Macmillan, 1995).

²³ Willetts (ed) *'The Conscience of the World'*, p. 33.

²⁴ For detailed discussions of these principles see Gordenker & Weiss *NGOs, the United Nations and Global Governance*; D. Otto, 'Nongovernmental Organizations in the United Nations: the Emerging Role of International Civil Society', *Human Rights Quarterly* (Vol.18, No.1, 1996), pp. 107-141; and Willetts *'The Conscience of the World'*. For an update on the changes in the 'politics of accreditation' see Peter Willetts, 'From "Consultative Arrangements" to "Partnership": the Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN' *Global Governance* (Vol. 6, No.2, April-June 2000), pp. 191-212.

²⁵ Anne Marie Clarke, Elisabeth J. Friedman and Kathryn Hochstetler, 'The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN

World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights and Women' *World Politics* (Vol. 51, No. 4, October 1998), pp. 1-35, p. 12.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

²⁷ Kal Ruastiala, 'States, NGOs and International Environmental Institutions' *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol. 41, No. 4, December 1997), pp. 719-740, p. 724. Or, as Clarke *et al* conclude, 'State sovereignty sets the limits of global civil society' *Ibid.*, p. 35.

²⁸ See for example the essays contained in Fox and Brown, *The Struggle for Accountability* and the analysis of Paul J. Nelson, 'Internationalising Economic and Environmental Policy: Transnational NGO Networks and the World Bank's Expanding Influence' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (Vol. 25, No.3, Winter 1996), pp. 605-633.

²⁹ Lee-Ann Broadhead, 'Commissioning Consent: Globalization and Global Governance' *International Journal* (Vol. LI, No.4, Autumn 1996), pp. 652-668, p. 660.

³⁰ O'Brien *et al.*, *Contesting Governance* p. 3.

³¹ David Held, 'Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order: Reflections on the 200th Anniversary of Kant's "Perpetual Peace"' *Alternatives* Vol. 20, No. 4, October-November 1995), pp. 415-429, p. 418.

³² Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, p. 16.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

³⁴ '[t]he asymmetrical production and distribution of life-chances which limit and erode the possibilities of political participation', *Ibid.*, p.171.

³⁵ J. Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations* (London: Verso, 1994), p. 129.

³⁶ The obvious and important exception to this is, of course, the European Union. Impressive as the advance in Union-wide citizenship rights has been, however, such rights still lag far behind the right of European capital to exploit the single market created by the Union. Even more seriously, the rights and benefits secured by the European Union are exclusive to citizens of member-states.

³⁷ Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, p. 233.

³⁸ James Petras, 'Imperialism and NGOs in Latin America' *Monthly Review* (Vol. 49, No. 7, December 1997), pp.10-27, p. 13. Italics in the original.

³⁹ L. Macdonald, *Supporting Civil Society: The Political Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Central America* (New York: Macmillan, 1995), p. 153.

⁴⁰ See for example S. Carapico, *Civil Society in Yemen: A Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and G. Clark, *The Politics of NGOs in South-East Asia: Participation and Protest in the Philippines* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998).

⁴¹ See for example, Tom Young "'A Project to be Realised': Global Liberalism and Contemporary Africa' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (Vol. 24, No. 3, Winter 1995), pp. 527-546.

⁴² See the interesting study of this period by Susanne Soederberg, 'State, Crisis, and Capital Accumulation in Mexico' *Historical Materialism: Research in Critical Marxist Theory* (forthcoming 2001).