Table 2 General comparison of Western state and quasi-imperial non-Western states
|
Western state |
quasi-imperial states |
|
|
military internationalization |
relatively cohesive and enduring bloc of military power, centred on NATO and other alliances (notably US-Japan); has survived the end of the Cold War and is held together by the challenges to its common interests in the new world situation; has clearly gone beyond simple alliances |
survival, or even development, of the historic national monopoly of violence, and the pursuit of state interests including to the point of inter- and intra-state war |
|
economic internationalization |
an increasingly complex institutionalized framework of pan-Western political-economic organizations through which the West manages its common interests in the world economy |
weak integration into Western-led world political-economic organizations |
|
internationalization of law |
a framework of internationalized law and regulation through which national jurisdictions are harmonized and transnational mobility by corporations and individuals is made possible |
weak involvement in the internationalization of law and regulation |
|
regional internationalization |
highly developed formal internationalization of pivotal European region; formal and substantive democratization increasingly reinforced; significant elements of internationalized citizenship are developing |
weak, superficial internationalization at best; persistence of major regional rivalries, including in military and even nuclear forms |
|
relation to global institutions |
ambivalent (especially US), but increasingly utilising UN system to legitimise worldwide hegemony, and supporting extensions of international law, economic management, political and military intervention |
ambivalent, but tending to be suspicious of Western-led international innovations; utilising UN system negatively, to restrain West and inhibit international authority impinging on nation-state prerogatives |
|
democratization and civil society |
formal democracy normalized within West, and increasingly deeply rooted, reinforced by internationalization; relatively strong civil society; democracy and human rights promoted outside West by both civil society and states |
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes and weak democratization, in which formal electoral democracy (if it exists) often crudely manipulated by elites; political and social freedoms are weakly recognized and enforced; civil society weak but emerging |
|
social inequality and welfare |
despite large socio-economic inequalities, some combination of state and private welfare systems which supports the majority of the population |
large socio-economic inequalities, with very inadequate or no social welfare systems, and coercion of both urban and rural society |
|
national and ethnic conflict |
increasingly multi-ethnic societies with relatively sophisticated management of national and ethnic conflicts; so that these are contained without the enormous disruptive potential which they have had in the past and continue to have outside the West |
multi-national societies in which the relations between states and peripheral, minority and indigenous groups are quasi-imperial – these groups have little protection; national or ethnic conflicts are often violent, ‘managed’ with fairly crude coercion |
|
media and propensity to war |
expanded media spheres which sensitise publics to military violence and make the management of conflict problematic for state power; hence preference for limited air war |
only partially open media, in which the abilities of state elites to manage news and opinion and fight wars is greater than in the West, but not unlimited |