Duncan S. A. Bell

Richard Wyn Jones, ed., Critical Theory and World Politics, London and Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. ISBN 1-55587-802-4.

Critical theory, in its various manifestations, has made a significant impact on the study of world politics since it first managed to breach the austere, fortified disciplinary walls of academic International Relations (IR) in the early 1980’s. (Traditionally it has taken roughly a generation for innovative ideas to filter into IR from cognate fields such as social theory, a phenomenon that is hopefully now confined to disciplinary history). Although more popular and respected in Europe than in America, which still remains, by virtue of its overwhelming power and the corresponding size of its academy, the central focus of the field, critical theory has now established itself as a potent presence, and as a powerful opponent of the positivistic approaches, whether neo-realism or various rational-choice forms of institutionalism, that continue to dominate the mainstream discourse.

Nevertheless, until now there has been no attempt to take stock of the critical turn in IR theory, to chart the multiple trajectories that those engaged in the project of critique have taken, and to posit directions for the future. Critical Theory and World Politics seeks to fill this gaping hole in the literature, and it is largely successful in its aim. The book is loosely based on the papers presented at a conference held in 1996 at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, a place with a plausible claim to being the engine room of the critical turn, and as such it occasionally suffers from a loss of focus, an unevenness of quality, and a fair degree of repetition. However, these are minor quibbles, and the high quality of most of the chapters, and the sophistication with which they engage key questions, more than makes up for these deficiencies.

The book opens with a useful introductory chapter by Richard Wyn Jones, in which he attempts to evaluate and reconcile the differences found within the community of critically-inclined scholars. He argues, correctly I think, that what unites critical theorists, whether influenced by Adorno or Horkheimer, their wayward heir Habermas, or Gramsci, is the idea of emancipatory release from currently existing social, political and knowledge-producing structures. He thus argues that critical IR theory should be seen not as a homogenous body of thought, but as a ‘constellation’ of approaches bound by a family resemblance. He concludes, again correctly I think, that critical theory, so (minimally) defined, opens up the most suitable intellectual space for engaging in a constructive and mutually beneficial dialogue with various post-structural and postmodern approaches, which are often held to be incompatible with critical theory due to their general distrust of metanarratives. What both these lines of critique share, of course, is a skeptical attitude towards instrumental reason, the notion of objectivity, and consequently the attempt - prevalent in mainstream IR - to develop a scientific understanding of the world.

The authors in Section 1 – Andrew Linklater, Robert Cox and Craig Murphy – attempt to sketch the shifting contours of critical IR, and in particular to engage with the question as to what critical theories should aim for, and how. Pervading these essays is a sense that there is an urgent need to answer the criticism leveled at critical IR scholars that, although interesting and sophisticated at a metatheoretical level, they fail to engage sufficiently with substantive questions, or propose concrete methods of achieving emancipation. Thus Linklater discusses ‘praxeology’, defined as the ‘moral capital that has been accumulated in the modern era and that can be exploited to create new forms of political community’ (25), claiming that it is one of the three domains with which critical theory must be concerned (the other two are the normative and the sociological). Cox, meanwhile, is determined to chart the outlines of a research programme, based on the attempt to highlight the central role played by power in shaping human societies: ‘Really existing power relations are the fundamental object of inquiry’ (47).

In Section 2 Kimberly Hutchings, Nick Rengger, Jeffrey Harrod and Mark Neufeld interrogate the concept of critique in critical IR. In an excellent essay Hutchings traces the idea back to its Kantian roots, and in so doing illustrates the philosophical (and practical) problem with remaining engaged at the level of metatheory, namely ‘lapsing back into the wars of reason between realist and idealist perspectives’ without any possibility of grounding, in a convincing manner, the truth-claims being made. (‘The mark of critique is precisely a fundamental insecurity about its conditions of possibility’ [87]). Thus, whilst remaining ever aware of this problem, and consequently remaining open to challenge, the critical theorist should proceed with modesty, and in the direction of empirical research. Rengger, in a typically incisive contribution, argues, following the pessimistic line of Adorno, that within the logic of critical theory lurks a potential ‘negative dialectic’ between the emancipatory impulse and the concrete manner in which this impulse might be operationalised in trying to change the world. In other words, in order to remain truly critical the theorist must also remain distant, for if they engage with specific institutional reforms, for example, they are to some degree being co-opted and will consequently have to rely on a degree of technical rationality which began as the object of critique.

Part 3 of the book attempts to highlight the various ways in which critical theory can inform substantive research, to deal with what Rengger calls the ‘Where’s the beef question?’, a question which seems to hang like a dark cloud over the project of critical IR. The responses – by Sandra Whitworth, Kenneth Baynes and Deiniol Lloyd Jones – go someway to answering the critics, and indeed point out the fruitful possibilities in adopting a critical theoretic research agenda. Whitworth, for example, provides a brief outline of her work on the dark underbelly of military peacekeeping operations, which she notes are normally viewed in a positive, unproblematic light. However, following fieldwork in Cambodia, in which she actually talked to the people where such operations occur, a more ambiguous, more disturbing picture begins to emerge. In particular, she highlights the massive growth of prostitution and the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS that followed the deployment of UN forces, and the inherently gendered nature of such operations. As she observes, one of the most important contributions of critical theory is in ‘shifting one’s gaze’ (156).

The final section is composed of two brief response pieces by scholars not generally identified with critical theory, namely Chris Brown, who argues that we need more clarity in defining what (and who) is covered by the term ‘critical theory’ and Alexander Wendt (the ‘new Waltz’), who argues that we need to envision IR as a ‘post-critical’ discipline, which although retaining the long-term emancipatory dream of critical theory, can also adapt to, and try to work for, short-term, incremental changes in social and political being. We thus need, he concludes, to fuse the time horizons of positivism and critical theory, in order to work towards a better world.

Overall, then, the book presents a comprehensive picture of the various critical theoretic approaches to be found in contemporary IR, and it should thus be seen as a timely ‘state of the art’ report from one of the most penetrating dissident margins of the field. As such, it represents a very important contribution to the existing literature, and I wholeheartedly recommend the book to both the converted and to those who remain wary of the claims made by the critical theorists; the former will be satisfied by the scope and vitality of the intellectual effort, as well as challenged by some of the constructive criticisms that are made, whilst the latter will hopefully come away – if they are not converted in the process - with a fuller appreciation of the intellectual sophistication and humane possibilities inherent in the critical project.

Duncan Bell is a postgraduate student at Cambridge University. duncanbell@hotmail.com