first review www.theglobalsite.ac.uk 2001
Christien van den Anker
Women and the capability approach
Nussbaum, M.C., Women and Human Development. The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, ISBN: 0-521-66086-6 (hbk)
Christien van den Anker is based at the Centre for Global Ethics, University of Birmingham c.vandenanker@bham.ac.uk
In Women and Human Development, Nussbaum defends her version of the capabilities approach. In the book she aims to show how this approach deals well with the dilemmas brought up by women’s lives in developing countries, with special reference to the case of women in India. Nussbaum understands capabilities as ‘basic powers of choice that make a moral claim for opportunities to be realized and to flourish’ (298) and argues that a capabilities approach serves as a good basis for constructing political principles and constitutional guarantees.
In a long (72 pages) first chapter, Nussbaum deals extensively with criticisms of universalism. The second chapter aims to show that the capabilities approach provides a better method to compare people’s quality of life than approaches looking at utility or GDP. In the final two chapters Nussbaum elaborates on this approach in relation to two problems in international development, namely the legal and political status of religion and the legal and political status of the family. Throughout the book, Nussbaum uses two examples from women’s lives in India and she brings in numerous concrete legal cases from India and the US. Nussbaum also relies on her experience in India on two recent trips which had a profound impact on her. The book is an explicit attempt to engage non-specialist audiences and a more philosophical volume on the capabilities approach is promised for later.
Generally, although Nussbaum views the lack of capabilities of women as a problem of justice, she emphasizes tragedy and lack of humanity rather than injustice when discussing specific examples. In terms of Nussbaum’s own aims, I think the book has partially succeeded. The aim of addressing a wider audience which goes beyond the western philosopher concerned with issues in development is commendable. However, on occasion the tone of the book is patronizing and the overly long arguments against criticisms of universalism would have been easier to understand if they had been presented more succinctly.
The aim of showing non-specialists the range of alternatives has not been fulfilled successfully in my opinion. There are various theories available that criticise the utilitarian or strictly economic measurements of development. Both the literature in political philosophy and in theories of development could have been discussed as alternatives to the capabilities approach. In addition, several alternative theories of justice promoting different ‘currencies of justice’ such as rights, primary goods and resources are not discussed in the book. The only in depth comparison Nussbaum offers is with welfare and other utilitarian or consequentialist approaches. A quick comparison between capabilities and rights leaves unclear whether Nussbaum refers to rights based approaches or any defense of human rights as embedded in international law. Especially when she states that capabilities can be seen as rights (p.14) the question arises why the book prefers the capabilities approach. One answer is that the rights discourse has attracted criticism from relativists. However, the capabilities approach makes bolder statements about what ‘a truly human life’ is than most approaches that favour rights language. And sometimes Nussbaum’s description of capabilities is very close to a human needs approach whereas this approach is not referred to a single time.
The aim of showing that the capabilities approach is a valuable approach amongst alternatives required in my view a more detailed discussion of what the approach stands for. This would not necessarily make it more specialist or inaccessible to non-philosophers. The final aim of focusing on political principles and constitution building is an interesting move beyond abstract political philosophy. However, there is a set of problems of implementation of just policies that need to be acknowledged in addition. For example, what is the role of international development policy? And what can be done if the constitution is in good shape yet is not implemented properly? The Indian constitution has excellent legal provisions for the elimination of slavery, bonded labour and child labour, yet the Indian government and local magistrates fail to implement them. Although it is commendable that Nussbaum moves beyond providing philosophical principles and into political strategy and constitutional principles, the further dilemmas and struggles surrounding implementation need to be addressed, too.
On the positive side, I like Nussbaum’s general approach to dilemmas. For example on child labour she proposes pragmatic stance, promoting school lunches as practices in Kerala and after work schooling. On religion she includes the importance religious expression has to people as well as the often oppressive history of most large religions and in talking about the family she acknowledges the important freedom to found a family and the risks of families as protected bulwarks within which abuse can take place.
The choice of India as an example provides an interesting empirical strand with useful information on concrete situations. Yet, it is not clear how the examples from India are representative either within India itself or in the wider context of either non-western or developing countries. Moreover, referencing the same two cases throughout the book easily creates the impression that they are somehow representative. There is a risk of creating a myth of an authentic Indian woman. Although Nussbaum recognises this danger in general on (47), her use of the examples is not necessarily exempt from it. In addition, I would have liked more explicit treatment of men’s lacking capabilities. Without diminishing the importance of including women’s experiences explicitly, there is an important task to be done to recognise men’s oppression as men. Nussbaum comments on this issue towards the end of the book, but she could have dealt with it much more upfront.
Nussbaum’s book provides useful discussions of several major topics in the areas of global ethics, development and political philosophy. For example, she discusses the universalism/relativism problem, the debate on what should be measured to assess people’s quality of life, the role of religion, the importance of care and justice and the role of constitutional change in creating opportunities for better lives; yet, on several occasions Nussbaum does not engage much with other authors on these debates. Her main sources of reference are Sen, Rawls and literature with examples from India. Yet, if its stated aim is to focus on political principles and constitution building, there arises a problem: what is the role of international development policy? And what if the constitution is in good shape yet is not implemented? Although it is commendable that Nussbaum moves beyond providing philosophical principles and into political strategy and constitutional principles, the dilemmas and struggles surrounding implementation need to be addressed, too.