Ipek Demir

 

The global constitution of 'failed states': the consequences of a new imperialism?

 

Conference organised by the Centre for Global Political Economy at the University of Sussex, 18-20 April 2001. This review was originally published in Studies in Social and Political Thought, issue 5, October 2001.

 

The Centre for Global Political Economy at the University of Sussex, working within a distinct perspective that has emereged within the International Relations and Politics subject group at this institution, launched its first major conference on an analysis of the global restructuring of capitalism and its impact on specific social formations. The main aim of the conference was to understand and critically evaluate the proliferation of representations of states other than advanced capitalist ones, especially the case of 'failed states'. Whether it be the 'weak states of Africa', the 'politically corrupt governments of Asia', the dominant explanation of 'failure' in the third world has been an atomistic one, taking states as entities in themselves, as sovereign equal bodies in the international state system, and as totally and utterly responsible for their own 'failure'. This methodological individualism, together with the dominance of the separation of the 'political' and the 'economic', have contributed to the formation of an ideological consensus about the 'failure of states' and the burden on the West to intervene on their behalf.­[1] Julian Saurin's and Branwen Gruffydd Jones's papers aimed at highlighting the ideological consequences of such dominant approaches.

 

The bulk of the conference papers examined the specific forms this intervention took and, more importantly, how it failed to deliver on its promises, be they under the banner of 'structural reforms', 'international economic stability' or 'humanitarian intervention'. The core concern of most of the papers I attended was the question of how the once 'thriving Asian miracles', the 'Latin American success stories' or other states that had won the praise of international financial institutions, G8 leaders or the Financial Times are now deeply sunk in political and economic chaos, and of how this 'failure' is understood and, more importantly, reproduced. The dominant approach, be it in the academia, the media or heard from the IMF, presupposes that the condition these countries have arrived at is as a result of the intrinsic particularities of the country in question, or at best sees this 'failure' as a consequence of the lack of reliable civil and judicial institutions, suggesting the establishment of liberal institutions as a solution to the problems of this or that 'failed state'. The adherents of this approach base their explanations of 'failed states' or 'failed policies' on 'political corruption', 'lack of transparency', 'creditors' panic', 'inefficiency', a 'corrupt national bourgeoisie' etc.

Far from seeing these as the causes of 'failed states', the conference papers, by contrast, viewed them as symptoms or by-products of a far wider problem: the global functioning of capitalism.

 

Having identified what are in fact the by-products of capitalist restructuring in these states as the causes of their 'failure', the dominant approach then moves on to advocate Western engagement, whether it be via international financial institutions such as the IMF, or security alliances, or both, in order to save these 'failed states' from themselves. The papers by Pinar Bedirhanoglu on Russia, by Yasser Elwy on Indonesia and by Galip Yalman on Turkey were among the many that aimed to highlight this inversion of cause and effect and its significance.

 

The conference papers seemed to fall into three categories: those dealing with concrete cases in a specific country or area, those dealing with general conceptual problems and those dealing with types of intervention such as intervention via international financial institutions, humanitarian intervention, or claimed democratisation. However, what most papers had in common was the recognition that these phenomena could not be explained without taking into consideration the global functioning of the capitalist market, together with its neo-liberal institutions and policies. Therefore, the explanations given were based on the impact of the interventions of Western financial institutions, the pressures created by financial markets in these countries, and their political and economic consequences. This was in no way to deny that these specific problems occur or that 'corrupt politicians' and 'opaque policies, traditions and laws' exist in so-called 'failed states'. The point made was rather against discourses that explain the failure of states by looking only at the internal dynamics of the country or issue studied. The conference thus made it possible to see the similarities between these 'failed states', examining patterns such as wholesale privatisation; the establishment of legal structures to facilitate capitalist transfers; and austerity measures brought in under the guise of 'structural reforms' and usually followed by stagnation and mounting corruption, high socio-economic costs and increased state violence.

 

Some of the conference papers articulated in detail the necessary links between the capitalist restructuring of these states and the by-products of this intervention. One contribution worth mentioning discussed how the 'shock therapy' forced on Russia by international financial institutions and foreign investors served to push Russia into an oligopolistic market structure, giving rise to corrupt relations, since even the Russian capitalists found it difficult to survive in a time of high taxes and increased regulation. It was also emphasised that the authoritarian and nationalist positions adopted by 'failed states' were inevitable consequences of the need to silence the social forces that opposed the restructuring of the economy in the interests of global capital, giving rise to more illiberal and intolerant structures. Likewise, Anthony D'Costa's paper looked at how the notion of 'failed states' is internalised. He examined the case of India in particular and the role of the domestic bourgeoisie in creating the basis for transnational integration to take place.

 

One of the most recent cases of a 'failed state' or the 'test case for a rather savage experiment of wholesale economic and political restructuring' (as Yalman put it in his paper) is that of Turkey. Since the country was introduced to trade liberalisation in the 1980s, consecutive governments, whether they be led by the Yale educated, Western oriented, female prime minister Çiller or the Islamist Erbakan, have proposed greater integration with the world economy as a panacea to high inflation and high interest rates. As Yalman underlined in his paper, during this period, the country, supported and supervised by the IMF and other financial institutions, saw foreign capital and national capital competing to plunder state assets and, despite their 'promises', failing to turn them into efficient, transparent businesses, instead choosing to profit from currency fluctuations, high interest rates and speculation. The economic promises of privatisation and deregulation[2] also came with a promise of state withdrawal from private life, thus making its citizens freer and better able to choose their own good. It was claimed this would make Turkey a more democratic and freer society.

 

It should come as no surprise that neither the promise of economic stabilisation nor that of political freedom was fulfilled. Political and economic mini-crises continued until last February when the bubble of this rent-seeking society burst. The happy relationship between the Turkish banks, the Turkish central bank and foreign capital[3], which can be referred to as the 'unholy triangle', finally cracked. Turkey has now joined the list of countries including Brazil, Indonesia, Russia and Argentina, which have become victims of volatile international capital flows. What is important to point out at this stage is not only the similarity of the economic and to some extent political cycles that Turkey, Argentina and many other 'failed states' have gone and are still going through, but rather that all this happened - as it did with the other countries mentioned - while their economies were under the close supervision of international financial institutions.[4] These are neither the first nor the last crises these countries are going through, but are inevitable by-products of the restructuring of their economies and social structures in line with global capital interests.

 

As regards the promised political freedom, the suggestion that democratic institutions and adherence to law would promote individual freedoms has once again proven to be a 'myth', as the necessary central role expected from the 'Turkish state' in the restructuring of the economy[5] has intensified state authoritarianism as well as nationalist discourse. Authoritarianism, state violence, intolerance and crime have become customary in these 'failed states' making it ever more impossible to create a society other than one organised along neo-liberal principles.

 

Other approaches to understanding 'failed states' were also present at the conference. Some of the papers presented and comments made by the audience placed the burden of failure on specific internal dynamics of the country being examined. Others understood the changes these 'failed states' were going through in a rather narrow way. One question in particular summarised such views: 'At what point - at which date - did Algeria become a failed state?' Perhaps not everybody grasped what the idea of 'failed states' was all about.

 

As with any other conference, some of the papers presented were disappointing. The authors of some papers seemed to think that the mere fact that they were being critical of the dominant discourse (which was in some cases questionable) made their paper valuable. Their papers lacked a firm analysis of what they were criticising or else provided very poor explanations of their own. Overall, however, the number of papers in which criticism was substantiated and explanations were presented with a high level of theorisation, involving sound empirical evidence, made the conference worthwhile.

 

Ipek Demir is reading for a DPhil in Social and Political Thought at the University of Sussex.