David Smith
Netwar and terrorism
Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D. (eds) Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 2001, ISBN: 0833030302, $25.00 (pbk) (also available online: go to www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/global-library and enter author surname).
Byman, D., Chalk, P., Hoffman, B., Rosenau, W., and Brannan, D., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 2001, ISBN: 0833030523, $16.00 (pbk).
The RAND corporation was initially started with funding from the United States Air Force and has grown to become one of the most important American strategic think-tanks. As such, any new publication from this body is of interest to those studying US defence policy. Given the current world situation and the continuing ‘war on terrorism’ when two books appear from this institution on that very subject then they are well worth studying.
For Arquilla and Ronfeldt the rapid spread of information technology, and especially the internet, has led to a revolution in conflict. While militaries focus on the use of cyberwar in an attempt to destroy one another’s assets, other groups use netwar, its " lower-intensity, societal-level counterpart" (p. ix) in order to carry through their aims. Netwar tends to be characterised by the formation of networked, as opposed to hierarchical, forms of organisation. They also increasingly emphasise the mobilisation of public opinion and the disruption of services rather than the physical destruction of the enemy (p. 1-2). Netwarriors are difficult to characterise. "Many … netwar actors will be nonstate, even stateless … [They] may be both subnational and transnational in scope … Furthermore, some bad actors … may threaten U.S. and other nation’s interests, but other actors … may have salutary liberalizing effects" (p. 7). The main power of netwar, however, seems to come in the concept of swarming. In this form of attack disparate forces come together suddenly to attack their objective from all sides and at multiple levels. Direct action is united with psychological, political, and media pressure to produce a sudden and powerful ‘pulse’ before the various groups melt away, conserving their forces for the next round (p. 12).
The other authors in the book look at a series of cases studies of netwar. The studies cover a number of areas from protest, through civil disobedience, to outright terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The broad theme of these case studies is to demonstrate how various organisations have been able to use network concepts, and particularly the Internet, to spread their message and mobilise supporters. The concept of netwar as an explanatory tool is compelling but it does have a number of problems. The casual equation, which continues throughout the book, of political activists, international criminals, and terrorists encourages these groups to be lumped together and thought of as anti-society. This can already be seen to be occurring in the United States where, post September 11th, anti-globalisation protesters have been described as un-American. While there may be some similarities in tactics between these groups their overall aims, as well as their attitudes towards violence, are totally different. There is also some doubt as to how modern and novel the concept of netwar really is. Arquilla and Ronfeldt give a short warning that netwar does not rely so much on technology as on a particular style of organisation; networks and netwar do not rely on the Internet. They cite the example of the Somali warlord Mohammed Aidid, who largely used runners and drum codes to communicate with his forces (p. 11). Indeed, it could be argued that terrorist and guerrilla groups have been using the many of the precepts of netwar, such as a fluid, non-hierarchical organisational structure, out of necessity for a very long time. The cell-structure that is common in many of these groups with localised leaders working for a common cause was adopted largely to frustrate intelligence operations and the interception of communications but fulfils many of the precepts of netwar. In fact, the advent of the internet and its potential to provide easy, cheap, and relatively secure communications may well allow many of these groups to become more, rather than less, hierarchical.
Byman et al., have focused on how insurgents receive the flow of arms, funds, and volunteers that is vital to the continuance of their struggle. They suggest that, since the end of the Cold War, states have markedly reduced their support for insurgencies. Although state support "remains an important source of strength for many insurgencies" the resources that states allocate "for this purpose pale in comparison to the support once offered by the United States and the Soviet Union." In short "state support is no longer the only, or necessarily the most important, game in town" (p. 2). The authors focus on a number of areas of external support. As well as discussing the changed position of states, they explore the role of diasporas and refugees in supporting insurgencies. These groups are instrumental in raising funds for and spreading awareness of insurgencies, as well as providing a ready source of volunteers to continue the struggle. The authors also discuss the emergence of two new groups of actors in insurgent support, religious organisations and wealthy individuals. They highlight the actions of one Californian medical practitioner who has contributed almost $4 million to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), or Tamil Tigers, in the last ten years (p. 80). They also point out the importance of religious groups in providing funds, volunteers and ideological inspiration for many groups. The many Arab, Islamic-oriented groups are an obvious example (p. 79). However, the authors are keen to point out that support can only come from these various quarters with the tacit compliance of states. A "state’s passivity has more of an impact than any formal support it may provide … It remains relatively easy for many illicit organizations to operate abroad, particularly within democratic states, where concerns about civil liberties, diaspora political pressure, and other factors have led to a de facto toleration for insurgent fundraising activities" (p. 106). Ultimately the state is still the final arbiter in the survival of an insurgency movement. This book suffers severely from a very narrow perspective. Despite occasional mention of organisations such as Hezbollah and the Taliban, most of the conclusions in the book are derived from a study of the LTTE. While this study is undoubtedly comprehensive the LTTE is by no means a stereotypical insurgent movement. Indeed it is questionable whether such a thing exists at all. At times the authors are in danger of over-generalising on the basis of very slender evidence.
Whether you agree with the arguments presented in these books or not, it is practically impossible to ignore them. One can be certain that their conclusions have been taken on board by senior figures within the American defence community and will inform US thinking on terrorism, guerrillas, protest movements, and insurgencies world wide. The current, American led, ‘war on terrorism’ clearly owes much of its strategy to this sort of thinking. The increasing surveillance of Muslims and the American efforts to force cooperation from foreign governments all have their roots in Byman et al.’s ideas about how insurgencies derive their support. These measures, while effective, come close to violating human rights and tend to lead to an intolerance of any opposing view. The suggestion that human rights groups tend to aid insurgencies because "counterinsurgency efforts tend to be violent and brutal" (Byman et al., p. 81) is almost a license to brutalise. Unfortunately this view of insurgencies and protest groups is portrayed in both these texts and lends itself to precisely this sort of interpretation.
David Smith is a doctoral student at the Department of International Politics University of Wales, Aberystwyth dss97@aber.ac.uk