Pinar Bilgin

Globalisation and security

Coker, C., ‘Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk’, Adelphi Paper, no. 345, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2002, ISBN 0198516711.

Notwithstanding the proliferation of literature on various aspects of globalisation, there is relatively little written work on the relationship between globalisation and security. As Ian Clark pointed to in Globalisation and International Relations Theory (Oxford: OUP, 1999) ‘of all the potential manifestations of globalisation, those in the security domain have been the least systematically explored’ (199). Christopher Coker’s study is intended to fill this gap in our thinking about globalisation—a gap that has become more apparent in the aftermath of September 11.

Coker’s brief study is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 opens with a discussion of globalisation and distinguishes between the global, globalism (the project) and globalisation (the process). The author argues that a major threat to security in contemporary world politics is constituted by the cultural divide between the globalised and the unglobalised. Expressing his pessimism about this gap being bridged in the short run, Coker submits that globalisation ‘offers the globalised hope of a more secure future or a world increasingly in tune with itself, it also makes many peoples, nations and societies who feel marginalized increasingly insecure, and in some cases predisposed to violence’ (21).

Chapter 2 further dwells upon the diverse implications of globalisation for security. Coker argues that the process of globalisation comprises ‘military deglobalisation’ in the countries of the post-industrial world, where military expenditures and manpower levels are in decline, incentives for war are reduced (particularly in democracies) and supra-territoriality is on the rise. This, maintains the author, has helped to create and maintain ‘zones of peace’. The very same process has constituted insecurities for people within states in other parts of the world—the so-called ‘zones of disorder’. Hence the author’s conviction that ‘globalisation stimulates war among those who are alienated from it’ (25). What is particularly problematic about the author’s argument here is not necessarily his narrow conception of peace (understood as the mere absence of violent conflict) or his confusing employment of the concept of ‘military deglobalisation’ to refer to the decline of war as an instrument of statecraft (a process identified by John Mueller as the ‘obsolescence of war in the developed world’ in Retreat From Doomsday [USA: Basic Books, 1989]) but his neglect of the ways in which the zones of peace and zones of war have co-constituted each other. As Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey pointed to in their 1999 essay ‘The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalisation’ (European Journal of International Relations 5:4, pp.403-434) for Western states the creation and maintenance of ‘liberal spaces’ at home has meant the use of force in the drawing of boundaries abroad. Glossing over this co-constitutive relationship between these two worlds not only reifies the divide, but also has practical implications for policy-making. For, Coker’s embrace of the so-called ‘two worlds’ approach implies the continued relevance of the military instrument in maintaining ‘security’ in some parts of the world without taking any responsibility in the process through which those zones remained insecure while the others moved on. This, in turn, renders difficult if not impossible for the ‘zone of disorder’ to become ‘zone of peace’.

The third chapter of Coker’s study identifies the ‘new’ threats included in the ‘new security agenda’, which confronts governments in a globalizing world. These threats include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, environmental damage, global inequality, migration, organized crime and HIV-AIDS. In an attempt to respond to this new and broader security agenda, argues Coker, governments sought to adopt alternative approaches to security such as that of ‘human security’, ‘preventive defence’, and ‘public-private voluntary partnership’. The fourth approach to security, that of ‘risk society’ developed by Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, is dwelt upon in detail in Chapter 4.

Coker adopts the ‘risk society’ approach to discuss the processes through which human beings created their own risks, and how ‘concern with risk’ has become an integral part of our daily existence. In this chapter, Coker’s main concern is the difficulties involved in policing and insuring against risks. The issue of ‘reflexive modernisation’, which is central to Beck’s conception of ‘risk society’, drops out of the discussion. Yet, it is a crucial part of Beck’s study Risk Society (London: Sage, 1992) where he explains how risks emanate not only from sources that are beyond human beings’ control (as with earthquakes) but are also human-made so far as they are rooted in the knowledge produced by experts worldwide (such as environmental pollution). This understanding has potential implications for security thinking as well as policy-making. For, adopting a ‘risk society’ approach involves putting emphasis on not only the need for preparing for a multiplicity of uncertainties, but also the need for reflecting upon the consequences of our own thinking and actions and (re)shaping practice.

The final chapter of Coker’s study looks as NATO within the context of globalisation. The author argues that NATO has ceased to be a ‘security community’ (in Deutsch’s terms) and transformed itself into a ‘risk community’ in view of the multiplicity of risks that came to replace threats of the past. Should this new approach of defining the post-Cold War international environment as one of ‘security challenges and risks’ fail due to disagreements between the United States and its European allies (over the issue of defining risks or the methods through which they are managed) argues Coker, NATO could become a ‘virtual’ community.

The conclusion presents alternative policy options that could be adopted to help manage the differences between the two sides. Coker clearly prefers to see the future of security in Europe being shaped by NATO. The alternative option of the European Union becoming the major security institution in Europe is ruled out due to the latter’s weak military capabilities. On the one hand this is surprising in that in the future threats are likely to take the form of ‘soft security’ threats, which the EU has proven itself capable of coping with. On the other hand, this is not surprising in that Coker’s work reflects the mood of the times, where the threat posed by non-state actors (networks in particular) once again brought to the fore the need for military preparedness. Although the stress put on military preparedness is understandable given the psychological impact of September 11, it is worth underlining that our thinking and practices of security are not merely responses to the threats that exist ‘out there’ but also help constitute those very threats. This recognition is also in the spirit of Beck’s ‘risk society’ approach.

Overall, Coker’s study is a welcome contribution to the literature on the relationship between security and globalisation. It is likely to provoke further thinking and research.

Pinar Bilgin is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University. pbilgin@bilkent.edu.tr