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Francesc Marc-Álvaro, Toni Strubell, William Outhwaite, Graham Pollock, Antoni Segura I Mas

Reflexive nationalism: the Catalan debate

further comments welcomed by the editor

Francesc Marc-Álvaro Precipice
Toni Strubell Nationalist anxiety
William Outhwaite Comment on Colomines
Graham Pollock Reflexive nationalism and conceptual false friends

Antoni Segura I Mas From multiculturalism to interculturalism

global times recently published Reflexive nationalism and politically correct imperialism by Agustí Colomines i Companys, of the Barcelona journal El Contemporani. This article presented what Graham Pollock, who translated Colomines' piece (as well as the articles by Marc-Álvaro and Strubell below) calls a 'somewhat unexpected critique of multiculturalism, from the perspective of ''civic'' nationalism, as an embodiment of an "ethnic'' model of citizenship'.

Here we extend the debate: the first two contributions, by Marc-Álvaro and Strubell, reflect on the current crisis of national politics in Catalonia; while Outhwaite makes a short direct response to Colomines, and Pollock himself offers both an explanation of the background to the debate and a critical commentary of his own. In the final paper, Segura clearly rejects multiculturalism in favour of a plural 'interculturalist' conception.

Francesc Marc-Álvaro, translated from from La Vanguardia 28/2/2001

Precipice

The wagon is only a few centimetres from the edge of the precipice and might slip over at any moment. The reporting of the comments on immigration made by Marta Ferrusola and the ex-speaker of the house, Herribert Barrera, are creating a formula which is as dangerous as it is distorted: Catalanism is equal to racism. Let us leave aside, for the moment, the unfortunate way in which these arguments were formulated. Given the status of their authors and the sensation and confusion they have caused, they are a time-bomb at the base of the democratic Catalan nationalism which we have know since the beginning the 20th century as political Catalanism. Another few weeks of senseless proclamations of this sort might well destroy decades of open and integrative Catalan nationalism. If this happens it will have been the work of public figures who openly state and believe themselves to be Catalan nationalists.

It may be that some short sighted spin doctor from the Generalitat or CiU advised Pujol and Mas to allow this sort of argument to pass without explicitly rejecting it, in the hope that it might bring in the votes of that wide sector of the population who hold similar views. This would be a perverse strategy for any democratic government to adopt. If this were to be the case, it would surely mean the beginning of the end of political Catalanism, and probably in favour of some anti-democratic alternative. It might bring votes today but it would bring political irrelevance tomorrow. If the democratic nationalism of CiU does not act as the first barrier against xenophobia in Catalonia it will be its first victim. Given that, for structural reasons, the PP and PSOE are better placed to resist the rise of populist groups playing on the fear of immigration as an electoral tactic, CiU would find itself in the weakest position.

Josep Ramoneda argued, in El País, that all nationalisms, including Catalan nationalism, have considerable elements of xenophobia. This is true, but I would go even further. All parties, be they on the Left or on the Right, Catalan and Spanish have large sectors which are susceptible to xenophobia. One need only think back to the transfer of votes [in France] from the communist and socialist Left directly to Le Penn's National Front. One need only observe the caution with which Zapatero speaks about the immigration law so as to avoid any substantial loss of votes to Aznar.

Ferrusola and the defence which Pujol made of her declarations put Catalanism on the spot. Every time they try to explain themselves they only make matters worse. And unfortunately neither Maragall nor the leaders of the PSC can be counted on to clean up the mess. They need votes in those neighbourhoods where they think the same as Ferrusola but only in Spanish. One lot talk while the others keep quiet. They all think about nothing other than the electoral urns and they are the epitomy of irrespobability.

Explanatory notes

Marta Ferrusola: The wife of the President of Catalonia Jordi Pujol.

Catalanism: Usage within the political tradition of Catalonia as a term for Catalan nationalism.

Generalitat: The name for the executive of the autonomous Catalan government.

CiU: "Convergencia i Unió" is the electoral coalition of social and Christian democrats which has governed Catalonia since the transition from dictatorship.

Artur Mas: Economic spokesperson for the party, Artur Mas has already been nominated as the successor to Pujol as the leader of "Convergencia".

PP and PSOE: Unlike the various nationalist partied, the Popular Party (the current party of government holding an absolute majority at the level of the Spanish state) and Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) present candidates across the Spanish state, usually adopting a regional suffix in the autonomous elections.

Zapatero: Current leader of the Spanish Socialist Party.

Immigration law: Currently a major bone of contention between the government and opposition parties, who presented a more liberal proposal, and with calls for its revision in a more progressive sense.

Aznar: Actual president of Spain and leader of the Popular Party which pushed through the conservative version of the new law.

Pascual Maragall: leader of the Catalan Socialist Party and the electoral bloc "Citizens for Change".

Toni Strubell (University of Deusto, Donostia/San Sebastian)

Nationalist anxiety

I am sure that Ernest Lluch would be happy for me to play on the title of his own article "Contra la angustia nacionalista" (Against nationalist anxiety La Vanguardia 24/2/2000) in order to reflect on ideas presented there which are of contemporary relevance. The recent declarations of another friend, the ex-speaker of the house Herribert Barrera, provide the contemporary point of reference for reflection on the 'nationalist anxiety' which was the theme of Lluch's article. I do not in any way share the views of Barrera on immigration. Nevertheless, I believe the time has come to recognise the very real anxiety felt by nationalists (amongst whom I count myself) and which Lluch discussed in his article.

Shortly before their deaths, the academic Rafael Lapesa and the ex-minister Fernandez Ordoñez were able to express similar anxieties over the future of the Castilian language within Catalonia, without this causing sensation in the Madrid based press. I believe, therefore, that it is only reasonable to recognise that many Catalan and Basque nationalists feel a certain anxiety over the absolute majority which the Popular Party holds at present in Spain, and the effects this has at all levels within our own particular realities.

Referring mainly to CiU, Lluch asked the nationalists to stop worrying about the possibility that one day non-nationalists might govern in Catalonia, and what this might mean for the language question and other points of symbolic reference. The naive Catalan nationalists of 1978 placed all their hopes on (good) education and the process of linguistic normalisation. They certainly did not count on the unabashed use of Castilian becoming normal to the extent it has in recent years in Catalonia and many would be shocked.

Nowadays, however, there is a certain type of "PC intellectualism" which urges us to accept with grace the possibility that our (and not their) language might disappear. The flaw in this neo-liberal position is that it tends to be held by those same people who are outraged by the idea that the Castilian language might one day disappear in Catalonia. As if the disappearance of one language should cause anxiety while that of others should not. Caramba! Surely those of us who feel for the Catalan language, and regret the defensive position it finds itself in, should at least be allowed a certain anxiety.

Given this level of anxiety one can comprehend, without sharing, some of the absurd outbursts that some of our senior citizens have made in this debate. Should we forgive Lapesa and Ordoñez for lamenting the imperfect linguistic colonisation of our country and turn instead to the castigation of our own people for lamenting the marginalisation of Catalan at home? Turning the argument about and looking at it from another point of view, we might ask what would happen given the (impossible but nonetheless interesting) hypothetical situation of a President in the Moncloa willing to criminalise all things Spanish? Would this really fail to raise anxiety in the Spanish speaking homelands? I believe there would be the same level of anxiety which is today experienced in the Basque country, in what is a comparable situation.

Today more than ever, and regardless of which party governs, one has to bear in mind that a whole generation, which struggled optimistically in defence of their language, has now to spend the last years of their life wondering if their language will survive. And this is not only the case in Valencia, la Franja and Catalonia North, where the ethnocide has been most vicious, but even in the Principality itself. I think that one has to be understanding if a Catalan speaker, who will have some difficulty hearing Catalan spoken on the metro in Barcelona nowadays, has the occasional lapsus. If this sort of gaff can be made by illustrious figures such as Lapesa and Ordoñez, who had a powerful state to defend them, what can we expect from those who have no state behind them and speak a minority language, which has been historically persecuted and is still defenceless today ? Is it not true that the sociologist and Spanish nationalist Armando de Miguel said he would have to get out his shotgun if Spanish were treated in the same way as Catalan?

The solution to this situation of anxiety and confusion is to give the Catalan nation that status which would allow it to articulate its own public opinion and act with the same degree of flexibility as other normal countries. That would allow the Catalan language to adopt the same defensive measures that other normal (that is state) languages benefit from. I am sure that Ernest Lluch, who gave so much for the cause of Catalan, would have looked kindly on this route towards the reduction of nationalist anxiety.

Explanatory notes

Ernest Lluch Ex-Minister in the Spanish Socialist government assassinated by ETA.

Fernandez Ordoñez Ex-Minister in the Adolfo Suárez Cabinet and, later, in the Spanish Socialist government. He died in 1992.

linguistic normalisation The process through which the Catalan language was supposed to recover from the repression suffered under the dictatorship of Franco, during which period it was illegal.

Moncloa The seat of Spanish state, as opposed to autonomous regional, Presidency.

Today more than ever In reference to the real fear felt during the period of the dictatorship that minority languages such as Basque and Catalan but also Bable, Gallician and Aranes would die out.

La Franja and Catalonia North The Catalan speaking area on the western border of Catalonia, moving into Aragón, is referred to as "la Franja" or strip. As in the Basque country, an area north of the French-Spanish border on the Pyrenees where Catalan is still widely spoken is referred to as "Northern Catalonia".

Principality The reduced area of Catalan speakers officially recognised as the autonomous region of Catalonia.

Armando de Miguel One of a group of academics who apparently falsified a document, know as the Declaration of the 2001, criticising the "normalisation" of Catalan and which immediately backfired and lead to an enormous popular campaign, know as the "Crida" in support of the Catalan language and culture.

William Outhwaite (University of Sussex)

Comment on Colomines

Readers who, like myself, are familiar with the Catalan situation only at second-hand will hesitate to comment on the tantalisingly brief paper by Agustí Colomines i Companys. I wonder, however, if there is a danger of throwing out the baby of multiculturalism, an often sickly infant which needs all the care it can get, with the bathwater of (in this case) Spanish political and linguistic domination.

If we accept, as I am inclined to do, the desirability of an independent Catalonia as a member state of an increasingly federal Europe, we must recognise that the linguistic and cultural dilemmas will remain largely unchanged in such a scenario. Immigration is, ceteris paribus, bad for local 'minority' languages, whether French in Montréal, Irish in Dublin, Flemish in Brussels or Catalan in Barcelona. (What counts here is of course not the minority or majority status of speakers on the ground, but what one might call the 'global state' or position of these languages.) It has, however, broader countervailing benefits. Multiculturalism at its best is a way of maximising the benefits, enabling a flexible negotiation of national, regional, ethnic and other identities. This is the positive side of the North American or earlier Central European models, which it seems a little harsh to call 'the most unjust and divisive of all possible societies'.

Some formulations of cosmopolitanism have undoubtedly been insensitive to local loyalties, seeing the germs of imperialist nationalism and ethnic cleansing in the most modest affirmations of distinctiveness. Post-nationalism, might mean, among other things, the possibility of affirming national identities along with other ones without raising such spectres.

Graham Pollock (University of Sussex)

Reflexive nationalism and conceptual false friends

The background to Agustí Colomines' argument is complex. It can be reconstructed, in part, from Catalan history and, in part, from a survey of the series of articles which precede the excerpt from "La Catalanitat de les pasteres". Nevertheless, a further level of complexity derives from its 'translation' into a 'world language' - a status not possessed by Catalan, which is not even recognised as an official European language. It is, therefore, important to note that this article is a presentation of an experience of 'minority' within a majority culture.

As a direct result of its ubiquity, this majority culture is especially prone to the development of an analytical blind spot which, paradoxically, presents itself in the form of a supposedly universal, or at least potentially translatable, experience. There is a serious risk, therefore, that, due to the cultural short circuit produced by the illusion of conceptual and experiential translation, the debate being fomented might appear banal, when in fact it is not even understood. Before presenting a survey of the foregoing polemic, therefore, I would like to suggest that we can sensitise ourselves to this blind spot through the notion of 'conceptual false friends'.

The Italian word 'morbido' is one of countless possible examples of the linguistic phenomenon of 'false friends'. Due to the similarity with the word 'morbid' it has a sinister ring to the ear of most English, and Spanish, speakers, but in Italian it means 'soft' and so has quite the opposite connotation and emotional charge. Most language students will be familiar with the concept at a theoretical level, that is, even if they never actually become fluent in the languages they are studying. And it will also be familiar to those who go off to spend a period teaching English as a foreign language (EFL), even if they manage, as many do, to avoid learning much of the language of their students speak. However, the reality of the different emotional reaction, which the word produces in English, Italian and Spanish listeners, is not really available to the students who never achieved fluency, nor to the well travelled EFL teachers who returned home still essentially monolingual.

As William Outhwaite has argued, with his notion of reflexive xenophobia, travelling does not necessarily make one more cosmopolitan or even less xenophobic. Consumer tourism has shows us that one can also move about an awful lot without actually travelling anywhere, in terms of the expanding horizons we used to talk about - and believe in firmly - before popular mass tourism became a reality. And a special hybrid exists in the xenophile who identifies so completely with the other as to adopt their ethnocentric and at time xenophobic perspectives. These are all examples of varying degrees of seemingly universalising forms of experience which, nevertheless, leave us analytically blind in some sense or another.

The English Catalan author Mathew Tree provides an example of the extent to which this blind spot can resist what one would imagine to be the utterly corrosive logic of personal experience. In an article entitled "PSE, Normal" (El Punt 2/4/2001) Tree deals with the complex, and to most English speakers alien, concept of 'linguistic normalisation' - the process of minority language rehabilitation initiated following Franco's dictatorship. He describes the problems his mother had when, having done her 'Catalan in three months' course, she visited Catalonia and found that everyone, including Catalan speakers, insisted on speaking to her in Spanish as soon as they realised she was a not a native Catalan speaker. He amusingly suggested that for his mother's next visit he would prepare a button with the legend 'I am not a nationalist. It's just that I'm not Spanish.' However, in spite of this Tree produces a strange argument at the centre of his article which seems to betray a blindness to the linguistic and cultural reality of his home country.

Born and bred in London, I have never been inculcated with the concept of a secondary or minority language. Connais pas. Therefore, I speak Catalan in Barcelona with the same frequency I speak English in London.

It may be that Tree's Gujarati is on a par with his Catalan, but it seems more likely that the ubiquity of English and the way minority languages and cultures have, until very recently, been ignored in Britain has rendered them as invisible and 'secret' as Catalan was during the dictatorship. This was certainly my own experience when I returned to Scotland, after a number of years living in Italy, and discovered that I had been surrounded by Italian throughout my childhood. The opportunity for enrichment through the recognition and development of minority cultures has been, and largely speaking still is, left untapped. In this sense the status of minority language might actually be an improvement on connais pas.

The notion of 'conceptual false friends' highlights the risk of simply translating (perhaps it would be more accurate to speak of conflating) the words to the nearest personal or cultural experience on the basis of the assumption that all human experience is essentially the same, or at least universally understandable and translatable. This is no doubt true, almost by definition. But, arguably, it involves actually having that experience first. Immigration affects majority and minority cultures differently and the experience of the immigrant in each situation is probably very different too. By opening a dialogue between thinkers working within a minority language and culture and those working within the majority language, the debate on nationalism and immigration offers a way to explore that experiential difference and its social, political and conceptual consequences.

Some background to the present debate

"Nacionalismo y catalanismo" appeared in the Catalan daily La Vanguardia (10/2/2000). In this Ernest Lluch (Catalan academic and socialist ex-minister assassinated by ETA) argued that a 'fundamental difference' exists between Catalanism and Catalan nationalism. He began his argument with a definition of nationalism taken from the Catalan Enciclopèdia, which he termed 'the best Catalan language dictionary' (a point on which he was later taken to task by Agustí Colomines):

Nationalism is the political attitude derived from the attribution of a superlative value to the nation and national attributes in ethical and political spheres.

Lluch then went on to set out his own understanding and interpretation of three essential differences between Catalanism and Catalan nationalism.

Catalanism is a political movement or a personal sentiment while nationalism is something which belongs to the "ethico-political." As a consequence, Catalanism is a political or personal attitude equivalent to other attitudes, such as that towards democracy and the form of government. Nationalism, however, goes beyond this to shape the person at an ethical level. It is reminiscent of the peculiar Leninist, Antonio Gramsci, who conceived of public activity as something belonging to the moral-political sphere. The difference between the two concepts is that nationalism penetrates ethics and morality much more profoundly than Catalanism.

The second difference is that nationalism attributes a "superlative" value to the national...For a Catalanist this "superlative" value does not exist. It is, rather, considered comparable to the other values of society and the individuals that go to make it up.

The third difference is that Catalanism has the characteristics typical of a political movement [but] without the additional conditions. Logically, therefore, it covers a wider number of citizens...The number of Catalanists is much higher than the number of Catalan nationalists and it is logical that this should be the case...[this is] a fundamental difference between Catalonia and the Basque Country.

Colomines replied to this argument with his "Catalanismo es nacionalismo" (La Vanguardia 17/2/2000). In this he dismisses Lluch's recourse to the definition from the Enciclopèdia with the claim that 'the philological argument is false as dictionaries can also be ideological.' He points out that the entry under 'Catalanismo' in the Diccionari d'Historia de Catalunya defines it as a historical movement equivalent to Catalan nationalism.

A movement of national vindication struggling for the political and cultural recognition of Catalonia which articulates itself within divers cultural currents and political and social doctrines aspiring to various levels of self government.

Part of the reason Colomines cites this entry is clearly to demonstrate the 'ideological' potential of dictionaries. But he also wants to point out that the authors of the entry are the historians Josep Termes, Professor of History at the Pompeu Fabra University, and Dr Teresa Abelló. He accuses Lluch of conflating Catalanism and Catalan-ness. Taking him to task on his second point of differentiation, he argues that the pluralist articulation of Catalanism is a sign that the "superlative" value of democracy is an integral aspect of Catalan nationalism. He then gives historical examples of what he clearly sees as the inseparable nature of the cultural expression from its political articulation.

National movements are by definition "historical movements". The theoretical investigation of these movements, regardless of the name given them, must start from the basis of the aims they have pursued historically and which define their political traditions.

With contemporary critiques of nationalism in mind one tends to link 'historicist' arguments with ideas about the invention of tradition, Hegelian teleologies and Herderian notions of essence, but this is clearly not what is being suggested here. Rather the argument seems to be that it is precisely because there is nothing 'essential' about nationalisms that a historical approach has to be adopted in which each is judged on its historical track record. This position was clarified in a reply made by Colomines to an article by Marçal Sintes, "Drets civils versus drets forals", which appeared in the Catalan daily Avui (8/6/2000).

Sintes adopts a perspective of positive criticism and views Catalan nationalism as an essentially positive phenomenon. He also agrees with Colomines in speaking of, 'the various versions of Catalanism ... or Catalan nationalism which, whatever might be said, is the same thing.' However, his article focuses on the need for Catalan nationalism to adopt pragmatic strategies in order to counter its weak position within the Spanish state.

Catalanism having no state or communicational framework of its own, is especially dependent on the generation of attractive ideas and projects ... because it is from these that it must draw its strength.

His article is essentially a call for a progressive regeneration of Catalan nationalism - by which he seems to mean principally "Convergencia i Unió" and the President of Catalonia, Jordi Pujol. And he warns against the risk of losing touch with the citizenry by adopting a backward looking position and ignoring important current issues such as education and immigration.

Rather than placing the emphasis on some romantic epic, it should be placed on the indivisibility of individual and collective rights ... . The defence of Catalan-ness should be situated within a logic similar to that which underpins women's struggle against discrimination ... . Our specific case ... deals with a national minority which has the right to survive and develop, in spite of having no state. This formulation, which any democrat would, in principle, have to accept, is also the cornerstone of Latin American indigenous demands ... . Civic values, democracy, individual and collective rights ... it is important that nationalism struggle to appropriate these words and concepts (and of the epic which belongs to them) because they form part of its essence ... . Not to do so would mean leaving them in the hands of demagogues for cynical use as weapons of erosion.

In his reply "Ep! Sintes, ni ètnics ni carlins" (Avui 17/6/2000), Colomines takes Sintes to task over his implied 'association of romanticism with the historicist articulation of Catalan nationalism.' He also dismisses the idea, implicit in the title of Sintes' article, that the vindication of the semi-feudal 'foral' rights or support for Don Carlos' claims to the Spanish throne had or have any place in the contemporary Catalan projects of nation building. However, his main objection is to the attempt by Sintes 'to substitute the vindication of national rights with the civil rights of an ethnic minority,' which he sees as regressive for two reasons. The first of these is essentially a question of historical description and definition.

Catalan nationalism has never been ethnic but rather civic. Unlike other types, it immediately adopted a progressive position in favour of a new order of industrial and urban modernity. This was far from being the vindication of a tribal movement and was only possible within the context of a democratic society (which does not exclude conflict given the existence of different class projects).

The second reason is one of nationalist strategy and Colomines accuses Sintes of an 'implicit and uncritical acceptance of the contemporary state of affairs.' He criticises Sintes for his apparent resignation to a decrease in the intensity of Catalan national sentiment and of assuming that, as a result, 'all attempts to modify - or even to break up - the Spanish state are impossible.' And he then goes on to set out his own understanding of what is 'basic' to the Catalan national project.

The Catalan nation rests upon a political, territorial and linguistic basis which demands political power, that is sovereignty. This is the root of the question and not the preservation of ethnic and personal rights within Spain. Either the Catalans have the right to their own sovereignty, so as not to be subject to any other power, or they do not. The patriotic constitutionalists and Spanish nationalists (admirers of the new German nationalism of Jürgen Habermas) will say not, but we Catalan nationalists have to work to make that possible one day or another.

The suggestion that Habermas is a nationalist may well seem bizarre to many reading from the perspective of a majority language and culture. However, from the perspective of minority 'stateless nationalism', the constitutional patriotism defended by Habermas is often seen as an apology of the nationalism of the state. The theory of constitutional patriotism is seen to become the legitimising discourse, within practical politics, for a conservative constitutionalism which refuses any dialogue with the minority national movements. English readers, therefore, may also find the attitude of stateless nationalism towards the 'nation-state,' and even nationalism itself, equally surprising.

The nation-state is the problem that has to be overcome because it is a thing of the past and moreover an oppressive past ... . At the end of the day ... Spain is a thing of the past. The future lies with a United Europe ... it is within this new political framework that Catalonia, along with other nationalities, will have to seek its autonomy and the preservation of its political, territorial, linguistic and civil rights.

This frank and self-consciously nationalist discourse then leads into the complex and potentially polemical position taken in "La Catalanitat de les pasteres" (see English translation). At the centre of this argument lies the intractable issue of realising solidarity between cultures within a state framework, which is itself permeated by nationalism, and where the allocation of resources for the sustenance and development of cultures and identities is a politically charged affair.

This issue is raised by Antoni Segura I Mas, Professor of history at the University of Barcelona, in his "Del multiculturalisme a la interculturalitat" (Avui 20/3/200). He cites a working document on immigration published by the Parliament of Catalonia which speaks of the 'accumulation of cultural aggression in both recent and distant Catalan history.' He points out that this makes the 'insertion' of newcomers with different cultural traits more difficult, because, as a result of its already weakened position, this can take place in a marginalised fashion and even to the detriment of local culture. However, he suggests that the term 'insertion' is preferable to integration, 'which is taking on an undeniably ideological charge,' and then goes on to argue that this must take place at the level of citizenship without the pretence of linking citizenship to the assimilation of culture. And on this basis he also rejects the term 'multiculturalism,' as incompatible with pluralism, in favour of 'interculturalism.

This cuts to the centre of the argument raised by Colomines. However, it also highlights the relationship between immigration, the evolution of European (not just Catalan) citizenship and the question of a European identity at large. The construction of European citizenship is, at an abstract and theoretical level, a shift towards a more universal identity. However, at the level of practical politics and social organisation, it does not start from zero and the articulation of a fair and democratic procedure of construction is neither as obvious nor as simple as the abstract notion of citizenship might suggest.

The call for a permissive attitude amongst the 'stateless nations' and national minorities has its logical corollary in access to participation and political power at the European state level. To speak of equality of citizenship while distributing autonomy to some but sovereignty to others is nationalist hypocrisy. However, the leader of the Spanish socialist party recently called upon the EU to ban the formation of new European states, thus providing one more demonstration of the extent to which the EU is still permeated by nationalism. Beneath the non-nationalist or post-nationalist rhetoric, the nationalism of the existing 'nation-states' continues to orient attitudes towards the EU.

The exchanges between these writers took place in the pages of the Catalan daily press and represent a first step in the translation of theoretical perspectives into practical politics, in the form of opinion making within the public sphere. Opposing analytical perspectives on the nation, nationalism and the workings of social and political identity have lead to arguments tending to legitimise different political projects for citizenship in the emerging European Union. However, the somewhat unexpected critique of multiculturalism, from the perspective of 'civic' nationalism, as an embodiment of an 'ethnic' model of citizenship highlights at least two problematic areas of complexity.

Firstly, it questions the assumption that progress towards a cosmopolitan, 'multicultural' and democratic European citizenship is, at least conceptually, unproblematic. Like the stateless 'persons' arriving in Catalonia, so the 'stateless nations' entering the European Union require a reconceptualisation of the 'host' state, if citizenship is to be a creative process rather than the imposition of an existing hierarchy. In his "Xenofobia versus xenofilia" (La Vanguardia 3/11/2000) Manuel Aznar López spoke of the need to, 'draw the consequences from our special link with the countries of Latin America.' This line of thought finds considerable resonance within Spanish nationalism and aims at a selective immigration policy of the type that favoured white immigration within the British Dominions. If we compare this attitude with the selective allocation of official status to languages (taken as a metaphor for national culture) within the EU then the existence of a hierarchy becomes visible.

Secondly, it shows that the tendency to make the analytical distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism into an absolute dichotomy and then characterise one as acceptable and the other as illegitimate is itself problematic. Replying to Lluch and Colomines (la Vanguardia 23/2/2000) I situated the debate within the framework of the partially opposing approaches to nationalism adopted by Anthony Smith and Ernest Gellner. While the Gellnerian perspective tends to characterise identity as the product of nationalism - industrialisation and state oriented politics, Smith's thesis allows an understanding of nationalism as a form of politics emerging from the politicisation of a socio-cultural basis of solidarity. Interculturalism seems to emerge logically from Smith's perspective as a model through which society might overcome the nation-state. However, civic nationalism's desire to distance itself from notions of ethnicity places a heavy focus on the state, which, at least for minority 'stateless nationalism' and the critique of the nation-state, is somewhat paradoxical.

Smith insists that all nationalisms mix civic and ethnic elements, and Catalan nationalism's heavy emphasis on the civic aspects in its own self image is partly a result of political pragmatism and partly a horror of the racist connotations of the term 'ethnic'. However, racism is not the unique prerogative of the explicit nationalists. As Francesc Marx-Álvaro argues in his "Precipicio" (La Vanguardia 28/2/2001, translated above), 'all parties left and right ... have a sector which is susceptible to xenophobia.' And as Salvador Cardús I Ros argues in his "La correció política com a censura" (Avui 3/3/2001), 'instead of correcting reality political correctness ... often represses the frank expression of conflict and exacerbates it until finally it detonates a social explosion.'

A more frank discussion of what we mean by ethnicity, the role it plays in collective identities, and how this relates to a distinction between multiculturalism and interculturalism, might help to dissolve notions of race and tribalism. It would also help to disperse the confusion caused through the application of the 'ethnic' tag, as a form of political delegitimisation. At times this can act as a smoke screen hiding the real cause of nationalist polarisation which is not 'ethnic difference' but the inflexibility of an existing system of states itself permeated by nationalism. At that point it might at least be possible to enter a more transparent discussion of the models of European citizenship being defended and modifications that would be necessary to the system of states in order to enact it.